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All branches of the law 
have seen the disappear­
ance of certain legal doc­
trines and the merger of 
others. Property law is no 
exception. Its simplifica­
tion has been brought 
about by statute, by ex­
tended analysis, and, nega­
tively, by the increasing 
pressure of day-to-day 
business. 
The evolution of prop­
erty law has been very 
slow. "Inertia, mistakes, a 
mixture of contradictory 
theories . . Adverse Pos­
session may have had 
more than its fair share." 
In a remarkably lucid 
and readable essay, Mr. 
Callahan relates the doc­
trine of Adverse Possession 
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Introduction 
IAW FORUM is an annual lecture series founded 
-A to provide an appropriate forum for scholarly 
analysis and projected solution of legal problems of 
lasting interest and importance. It is a tribute to the 
maturity of the student body of the Ohio State Uni­
versity College of Law that this type of lecture series 
was conceived and promoted by students, and that 
in substantial part it is financially underwritten by 
the Student Bar Association of the College. Other 
financial support is provided through the Ohio State 
University Development Fund. Lectures which 
make a significant contribution to a clearer under­
standing of the law merit preservation to ensure 
availability to the largest possible audience. Publi­
cation by the Ohio State University Press is the ideal 
medium for casting the spoken word into the 
printed record. The College expresses to the Uni­
versity Press, to the Development Fund and its do­
nors, and to the Student Bar Association its warm 
appreciation of their combined support of LAW 
FORUM. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
It was altogether fitting that the initial lectures of 
LAW FORUM should be given by one of the College's 
ablest graduates. Since graduation in law in 1934, 
with the honors degree of Doctor of Jurisprudence, 
Charles Clifford Callahan has with profit to all pur­
sued the life of the scholar, first in pioneering legal 
research at Yale in collaboration with Professor Un­
derhill Moore, and, for the past seventeen years, as 
a teacher of law in The Ohio State University. Pos­
sessed of an enviable orderliness of mind, Professor 
Callahan has a unique ability to "unwind" the diffi­
cult in law, whether of thorny theory or of unruly 
fact. Possessed of an equally enviable keenness of 
intellect, his insight into the dynamics of legal insti­
tutions and operations lays bare for ordinary under­
standing the darkest corners of the law. His master­
ful exposition of Powers of Appointment in American 
Law of Property is now matched by an unforgetta­
ble illumination of the formerly ill-understood do­
main of property law known as Adverse Posses­
sion. 
FRANK R. STRONG, 
Dean, College of Law, 
The Ohio State University 
Preface 
THESE LECTURES, with only very slight changes, are printed as they were presented at 
the Ohio State University College of Law on March 
27, 28 and 29,1960. The notes have been added, not 
with any intent to document the material, but rather 
to avoid—so far as one can avoid—taking credit for 
the ideas of others. They have been placed at the 
back so as not to intrude, inconveniently, upon the 
reader's attention. 
There may be those who will expect some word 
of explanation, if not an apology, for the subject 
matter as disclosed by the title. I offer none. The 
fact that a subject cannot qualify as the legal mat­
ter-of-the-moment does not mean that it is unworthy 
of attention; and that a question has arisen repeat­
edly over a couple of hundred years does not mean 
that it has been answered satisfactorily. I do not 
suggest, of course, that there are satisfactory an­
swers in these lectures. What I do suggest is that 
there is justification for detailed and continuing 
x
 PREFACE 
consideration of even such subjects as adverse pos­
session. 
Thanks are due to the American Law Institute 
and to the Yale Law Journal for permission to use 
material which I have quoted, as well as to the nu­
merous people who, knowingly or otherwise, have 
supplied ideas. 
Columbus, Ohio CHARLES C. CALLAHAN 
October 7, 1960 
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Property, Policy, and Possession 
IN 1952, halfway between the explosion of the first atomic bomb and the first successful pot­
shot at the Moon, the Court of Appeals of New 
York decided a case entitled Van Valkenburgh v. 
Lutz.1 These three events are not of equal signifi­
cance. The contrast is great, not only in significance 
but also in the precision of technique by which the 
three results were obtained. I do not propose to make 
these lectures an extended case note on Van Valken­
burgh v. Lutz, but it will serve perhaps as a setting. 
The recorded history of William Lutz begins in 
1912 when, newly married, he moved to Yonkers 
from New York and bought lots 14 and 15, block 52, 
in a then largely unimproved subdivision known as 
the Murray Estate. Immediately adjoining was a tri­
angular tract of land formed of lots 19, 20, 21, and 
22, which tract is the subject of the litigation. Liv­
ing elsewhere in Yonkers, Lutz and his brother 
Charlie cleared the land, including a considerable 
part, if not all, of the triangular tract which he didn't 
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own. From that time on the Lutzes paid little atten­
tion to lot lines. In 1917 Lutz began the construction 
of a house, on a do-it-yourself basis. The family 
moved into the house in 1920 when it was nearly 
completed, and continued to live there until 1948 
when Lutz died. His wife still lived there at the 
time of the action. Five Lutz children grew up in 
this house and most of them left it for a wider world. 
The house stands entirely on lots 14 and 15, the 
property owned by Lutz. As early as 1914, Lutz be­
gan cultivating the triangular tract. Fruit trees were 
planted on it and a garden was begun. This garden­
ing appears to have gone on throughout the entire 
period, the Lutzes raising, according to several wit­
nesses, "all kinds of vegetables." Between 1919 and 
1923 Lutz built a one-room structure wholly on the 
triangular tract which he did not own. This struc­
ture, known to the neighbors as "Charlie's House," 
was just that; and Charlie still was living in it at the 
time of the action. At about the same time, they also 
built a garage. The garage, for the most part, was on 
the property owned by Lutz; but concededly there 
was an encroachment onto the triangular tract. 
In 1928, a private pipe line which Lutz had in­
stalled was broken by road contractors. Lutz, who 
was working at the time in New York, had to come 
home to fix the line. As a result he lost his job and, 
somehow, never got another. He was, as one witness 
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testified, "usually always at home," tending the gar­
den, selling vegetables, doing odd jobs. 
The triangular tract was used by the Lutzes for 
purposes other than gardening and Charlie's resi­
dence. Chickens were raised—sometimes they had 
as many as 200—and these were kept in coops on 
the tract. The land was also used as a depository for 
what was variously described as "junk," "rubbish," 
"debris," and "father's personal belongings." This 
consisted of cast-off furniture, salvaged building 
materials, and sundry automobile parts. In addition, 
the Lutzes and others used a well-defined strip re­
ferred to as the "traveled way," which crossed the 
premises in question and terminated at Lutz's ga­
rage. 
In 1937, Joseph D. Van Valkenburgh built a new 
house, within sight of the property in dispute. In 
1946, some trouble arose between Lutz and Van 
Valkenburgh, as a result of which Lutz was ar­
rested. In 1947, the Van Valkenburghs bought sev­
eral lots from the City of Yonkers in proceedings to 
foreclose tax liens; these were not in rem proceed­
ings. The Van Valkenburghs' purchase included the 
four lots forming the triangular tract which the 
Lutzes had been using since 1912. Soon after this 
purchase the Van Valkenburghs put a fence across 
the "traveled way." More trouble. Lutz brought an 
action and Van Valkenburgh was enjoined from 
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maintaining the fence.2 In that action Lutz testified 
that he knew all the time that Charlie's House was 
built on someone else's land, but that he thought 
he was building the garage wholly on his own land. 
In August, 1948, William Lutz died. In Octo­
ber, 1948, Van Valkenburgh brought an action to 
compel the removal of the garage, shack, chicken 
coop and other things from the triangular tract and 
to compel delivery of possession of the land to the 
plaintiff. At the trial before a referee, in 1951, the 
testimony of William Lutz, given in the earlier ac­
tion, was introduced along with other testimony, 
totaling some 250 pages. There were 56 exhibits, 
consisting of deeds, surveys, and photographs. 
The referee found that Lutz had acquired title 
to the triangular tract by adverse possession, at least 
by 1935 (the New York Statute of Limitations is fif­
teen years), and, on this finding, judgment was en­
tered for the defendant, Mary Lutz. This judgment 
was affirmed by the Appellate Division.3 
The Court of Appeals, by a four to three vote, re­
versed and ordered judgment for the plaintiff for 
the relief prayed for in the complaint, subject to 
the existing easement over the "traveled way." 
The majority opinion may be summarized as fol­
lows: 
1. Under New York law, to acquire land by ad­
verse possession not founded on a written instru­
ment there must have been an actual occupation 
PROPERTY, POLICY, AND POSSESSION ' 
under claim of title. Only the premises actually oc­
cupied are held adversely. In order to show actual 
occupation it must be proved either that there was 
a substantial enclosure or that the premises were 
usually cultivated or improved. 
2. Concededly, there is no proof that the prem­
ises were protected by a substantial enclosure, and 
the proof of cultivation fails to show that the garden 
utilized the whole of the premises claimed. This 
lack cannot be supplied by inference from the culti­
vation of an ill-defined smaller area. 
3. As to the question of improvements, I quote: 
The proof fails to show that the premises were 
improved. According to the proof the small 
shed or shack (about 5 by 10M feet) . was 
located on the subject premises about 14 feet from 
the Lutz boundary line . and, as Lutz himself 
testified, he knew at the time it was not on his land, 
and his wife, a defendant here, also testified to the 
same effect. 
The statute requires as an essential element of 
proof, recognized as fundamental on the concept of 
adversity since ancient times, that the occupation 
of premises by 'under a claim of title' . in other 
words, hostile, and when lacking will not bar 
the legal title no matter how long the occupa­
tion may have continued. 
Similarly, the garage encroachment, extending 
a few inches over the boundary line, fails to supply 
proof of occupation by improvement. Lutz himself 
testified that when he built the garage he had no 
survey and thought he was getting it on his own 
8 ADVERSE POSSESSION 
property, which certainly falls short of establishing 
that he did it under a claim of title hostile to the 
true owner. 
Lutz's position that the triangular tract belonged 
to Van Valkenburgh was made clear, the court said, 
by his bringing of the former action to establish an 
easement by prescription over it in favor of himself. 
There was a considerably more lengthy dissent­
ing opinion which, for our purposes, may be sum­
marized as saying that all this is wrong. 
I do not propose to go into all the questions 
raised by the case at this point. I'd like, however, to 
make some comments: 
1. All this disagreement over a relatively simple 
case makes it clear that there's a lot here that hasn't 
been resolved in more than three hundred years. 
We are not going to put any legal Sputniks into or­
bit with the kind of tools we are working with. 
2. It's possible to say, and it may be perfectly cor­
rect to say, that all the talk in the opinion between 
the statement of facts and the decision has very lit­
tle to do with the actual reasons for the decision. 
As students love to say, it's just a "peg" on which to 
hang a decision already reached by undisclosed de­
vices. Lutz's actions according to the brief of the 
plaintiff, "were typical of an irresponsible squatter, 
guided by motives of pure expediency. [He] 
did nothing to improve the land but littered the 
woods around his house with filth and junk, brought 
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in by scavenging the dump. On the other hand the 
plaintiff is trying merely to obtain the normal 
rights of ownership and to protect his home 
by cleaning up the neighborhood."4 The defend­
ants brief looks at the matter differently: In their 
view, the plaintiff, "obviously manifesting his self-
proclaimed superiority to poor people, means 
to clear the neighborhood of the Lutz family 
who were born, nourished and grew into manhood 
and womanhood there long before Van Valkenburgh 
took it upon himself to attempt, at all costs, to drive 
them out." 6 Is the disagreement over these consid­
erations, or others like them? If we believe it is, 
shouldn't we attempt to fit them into some orderly 
pattern? This sort of thing is too easily used as the 
basis for a nothing-to-worry-about-because-noth­
ing-we-can-do-about-it attitude. If we are going to 
talk about the judge's breakfast, and that thing is 
still appearing in print in I960,6 then we'd better be 
prepared to analyze it. And while we're at it, we'd 
better include lunch and dinner too; not all judicial 
decisions are made in the morning. If it's true that 
the "stuff" of judicial decision is merely a "peg," 
then it may even be worthwhile to improve the 
pegs. 
3. It's true that some of the requirements of ad­
verse possession which the New York Court relied 
upon are statutory. The requirement that the occu­
pancy be under a "claim of title" is in a statute.7 
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So is the requirement that the potential claimant 
must show either a substantial enclosure or that the 
premises were usually cultivated or improved.8 But 
this makes no difference. It won't do to say that we 
don't have to consider this question because it has 
already been decided by the legislature. Statutes 
and judge-made law should, it seems to me, have 
the same basic purpose. Both can be made; both 
can be changed; and one should be no less subject 
to examination than the other. 
4. The elements of the opinion in the Lutz case 
which have to do with the state of Lutz's mind as to 
the ownership of the land are not atypical of adverse 
possession cases. This has been one of the main dif­
ficulties. It is unusual, perhaps, for the facts to fall 
in such a way that both sides of the matter are pre­
sented in one case. Prowling around in Lutz's head 
produced a result which, superficially at least, is re­
markable. Lutz was not an adverse possessor with 
respect to Charlie's shack because he knew it was 
on someone else's land. He was not an adverse pos­
sessor with respect to the garage because he thought 
it was on his own land. I'm always a little suspicious 
of my logic in these matters; but if you compare 
this with a list of the possible states of mind you 
may conclude that the only true adverse possessor 
is one who, with respect to the title to the land, has 
no views whatever. Now, this may be what we want, 
but I should think the burden is on the proponent. 
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The decision in Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz is 
within the area of law commonly referred to as Ad­
verse Possession, which is the subject of these dis­
cussions. It is difficult, at the outset, to resist the 
temptation to plunge at those two words, tear them 
syllable-from-syllable, and invite you to view the 
emptiness which remains. I hope I can resist that 
temptation. The words have a history of long and 
widespread use which carries a presumption of use­
fulness and which entitles them to some respect 
from the likes of me. If I were to spend all my time 
attacking them, you might well question, at the con­
clusion, where the emptiness really lies. I shall not 
attack; but I shall question. If any of my questions 
implies criticism, it is criticism of myself. At some 
time or other in the past, I must have undertaken 
voluntarily to work in the property field. I don't 
recall that it was forced on me, although certain 
events may have slipped my mind after twenty 
years or so. 
I suppose there is no one here who has not heard 
repeatedly the assertion that the law, and the study 
of law, is not the same as it was when the speaker 
was in law school, or when the speaker first started 
his practice fifty years ago next summer. Wide new 
fields have opened up: a large proportion of a law­
yer's practice is before administrative agencies; la­
bor law and international law are very important; 
taxation, which thirty years ago was just a puppy of 
1 2
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constitutional law, is now an overgrown mastiff 
whose shadow darkens all other legal fields. There 
can be no question that all this is true; and there can 
be no question that excitement is there. These sub­
jects are riding the cow-catcher of the law; each 
curve brings new views, and each station a new edi­
tion of the New York Times. All of this newness 
must be assimilated rapidly—seminared, confer­
enced, instituted, round-tabled, law reviewed, and 
loose-leafed. I do not mean to disparage this. It is 
good, as well as unavoidable. I merely wish to 
point out that here we are dealing, largely, with the 
other end of the train. I invite your attention to the 
situation in the caboose. 
If this analogy were to be carried further, and 
perhaps it would be best not to do so, it could be 
suggested that it is common experience that both 
ends of a train generally move at the same speed, 
that for each new vista revealed at the front, one dis­
appears at the back. That has not, I suppose, been 
the experience of the law; but I submit there is 
more to the point than one may, atfirst, suppose. It 
is not true that the entire body of the law has been 
increased by the sum of the quantities added to it 
in the last five, twenty-five, fifty, or a hundred years. 
A subtractive process has been operating at the 
same time. Doctrines, rules, and problems have 
been disappearing; other doctrines, rules, and prob­
lems, once treated separately, have merged so that 
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only one grows where two grew before. No one 
would assert that the net result of this addition and 
subtraction is zero, so as to maintain a constant 
quantity of law with a continually changing con­
tent. Difficult as it is for many of us to embrace a 
new idea, it is much easier than to discard an old 
one. But it is a mistake to overlook the fact that old 
ideas are being discarded; it is a mistake to assume 
that the amount of the discard is not substantial; 
and it is a mistake to assume our legal processes are 
such that somehow, automatically, the best and 
most useful ideas will be retained while only the 
legal chaff will be blown away. The devices by 
which legal doctrines are consigned to oblivion are 
much too haphazard to produce such results. 
It must be true that change, involving the disap­
pearance of some legal doctrines and the merger of 
others, has been going on in all branches of the law. 
I do not speak to all branches of the law; but I can 
assert that it is true of the law of property. It may 
even be that the total volume of property law, so far 
as concerns basic concepts, is shrinking and will con­
tinue to shrink. If those of us who teach it are con­
cerned that we will have less and less to teach, we 
may take comfort in the knowledge that we will 
have less and less time available in which to teach it. 
It would be something more than obvious to say 
that, in the law of property, change of any kind 
comes slowly. You may have heard the rumor that 
1 4
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it comes more slowly here than in any other branch 
of the law, and I rather believe it's true. Once a 
rule of property is established, under a general sys­
tem like our present one, we almost never can get 
completely free of it. Chains of title to land depend 
on the law in force at the time each link was added. 
The rule requiring words of inheritance to be in­
cluded in a deed to an individual grantee or gran­
tees in order to transfer an estate in fee simple has 
been abandoned nearly everywhere. In Ohio this 
was accomplished by statute thirty-five years ago.*7 
Nevertheless, deeds delivered before 1925 appear 
in the chain of title to nearly all of the land in the 
state. Those deeds are subject to the rule, the ques­
tion may still be raised, and the rule will be ap­
plied.10 The Rule in Shelley's Case is applicable to 
deeds delivered before 1941." The Statute of De­
scent and Distribution has been changed a number 
of times, but it is still necessary, on occasion, to go 
back to one of the former statutes. Such instances 
could be multiplied. As time passes, people die, lim­
itation periods of one sort or another expire, and the 
likelihood that an old rule will come back to haunt 
us diminishes virtually to zero, although it may be, 
at least in theory, that some rules will never disap­
pear completely. 
Of course, the fact that it may take a very long 
time to put a change completely into effect is no 
reason for refusing to make it if the change seems 
expedient; but it may, to some extent, dull the mo­
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tive to do so. Temporarily it will be necessary to 
treat one case under one rule and the next under 
another, a complication which most of us like to 
avoid. More important, perhaps, if it appears that a 
proposed change cannot effect a substantial cure 
within the immediate future, many who are along 
in years will feel less compelled to make it. This, for 
want of a better term, is just human nature; and it 
means that some who are best able to effect a change 
are least inclined to do it. 
Another factor which slows evolution in the law 
of property is the reputation which has become at­
tached to that law and to those working directly 
with it. Nothing much is expected of us. It is under­
stood that we have a license not to make sense. 
When we don't, which is frequently enough, those 
who know tolerate it because they have come to ex­
pect it. Those who don't know must assume our va­
lidity. After all, you can't laugh off an incorporeal 
hereditament when you don't know what it is. 
I should like to examine briefly some of the de­
vices by which the law of property has shrunk, and 
is shrinking. This is a sampling; I do not propose a 
complete survey, nor a thorough examination of 
any instance. 
Change in Property Law 
No doubt there are many ways in which changes 
in law come about; and no doubt any given change 
can be traced to more than one cause. I'd like, how­
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ever, to consider three aspects of the matter as 
though they were separate. The order suggests no 
ranking as to frequency or importance. 
1. One device which I think is operating to a con­
siderable extent in the law of property is simple lack 
of understanding. I know that may sound harsh and 
I don't mean it to be. I'm not even suggesting that 
it always works out badly, although the chance of 
it's working out well in a particular instance would 
seem to be random. 
By lack of understanding I don't mean lack of 
capacity to understand, but rather a lack of time, 
and perhaps motivation, to make a thorough inquiry 
into any particular point. No one who reads many 
court opinions of a hundred, or even fifty, years 
ago can fail to conclude that life at the bar and on 
the bench must have been very different then. 
Those opinions, if anything, suffered from an excess 
of scholarship. The report of Ex Parte Bushnell,12 
an Ohio case, concededly an important case politi­
cally, is 263 pages long. Teaff v. Hewitt,13 another 
Ohio case, for better or for worse, has become the 
leading case in the country on the law of fixtures. It 
has no discernible political aspects. Yet the opinion 
occupies 33 pages, all of which are original writing, 
not quotation from others. When one considers that 
these opinions were written without law clerks and 
without typewriters, and were set in type by hand, 
it is apparent that there must have been more 
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time to get things done. There was more time to 
read and consider cases, and many, many fewer 
cases to read and consider. There was time to read 
Littleton and even, apparently, time to read Mi­
nor's Institutes. Anyone who has tried the latter 
must agree that it takes some doing. One gets, from 
the old opinions, a feeling of long, leisurely summer 
afternoons with plenty of time to engage in the legal 
whittling which fashioned some of our property 
concepts. 
Whether the results of this quill-pen jurispru­
dence were good is certainly questionable; but the 
immediate point is that there is not, and cannot be, 
any more of it. The pressure of day-to-day business 
is said to be, and undoubtedly is, considerable. Even 
the ivory tower of the teaching profession is begin­
ning to look suspiciously like stainless steel. Teach­
ers, lawyers, judges—we are all, I believe, moving 
away from the scholarly tradition. Again, I don't 
complain about this; I merely suggest that it's so. 
Accordingly, many of the niceties of property law 
are disappearing, not through the deliberate choice 
of anyone, but rather because of the lack of time to 
master them in the face of the demands made by 
what may be conceded to be more signficant mat­
ters. To my mind this process is rather clearly dis­
cernible in the law of Future Interests, especially 
that part of it which deals with the presumably his­
toric classification of those interests and the conse­
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quences which attach to each class. Much of the 
significance of the classification has been relegated 
to the history books by various and widespread stat­
utory enactments. The cases in which it really mat­
ters whether a particular interest is a remainder or 
an executory interest, or whether it is a possibility 
of reverter or a power of termination, are now rather 
rare. The lawyer in the street, if we may so designate 
him, feels, with considerable justification, that he 
does not need to know the differences; and he takes 
full advantage of this freedom. The courts do the 
same. They are likely to refer to a given future inter­
est by any name which approximates the conven­
tion. One of our local cases," for example, referred 
to the interest taken by the grantee of a deed as 
a determinable, base, or qualified fee simple estate, 
or more specifically speaking, it was a fee simple 
on express condition subsequent. 
and the interest retained by the grantor in the same 
deed 
has been variously designated as the right of re­
version, the possibility of reverter, the possibility 
of forfeiture, the right of entry or re-entry, and the 
right to declare a forfeiture for condition broken. 
With enough of this going on, the time will come 
when there will be, in fact, no discoverable distinc­
tions. If anyone were to ask whether that is a desira­
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ble end, in this instance, I'd say yes, I believe it is. 
If, by some miracle which we all dream of at times, 
we were able to start over on the whole matter, and 
provide for such future interests as we believed 
were needed, I shouldn't think that anyone would 
seriously propose that there should be as many as 
five principal classes. Perhaps some would cam­
paign for three and some for two. Conceivably, if 
we really were to start over, it might not occur to 
anyone that we needed more than one. But the 
question is not whether the number of future inter­
ests should be reduced to four, or three, or two, or 
one. The question is whether the reduction should 
be allowed to come about in this hit-or-miss fashion 
without any real attention to the merits. 
The appearance of the Property Restatement has, 
I believe, slowed temporarily this process of merg­
ing the future interests through complacent confu­
sion. The part of the Restatement which deals with 
Future Interests is, as many of you know, long, de­
tailed, and probably as accurate as a project of that 
kind could be. The major question of policy—is it a 
good idea to attempt to restate the existing law 
and thus perhaps freeze it—is one which can be, 
and has been, answered in both ways. The reference 
to the Future Interests Restatement as "a superb in­
ventory of the Augean stables"15 reflects both its 
strength and its weakness. The Restatement has, I 
believe, done quite a bit by way of clarification; but 
2 0
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where the need for simplification is felt it is likely 
to be attained, if need be, by confusing the clarifica­
tion. 
2. I do not propose to consider at any great length 
the simplification of property law which has been 
brought about by statute. But it should not be over­
looked. I have referred to statutes eliminating the 
requirement of words of inheritance to pass a fee by 
deed. This is a sensible change, more so than is at 
once apparent because it also eliminates a lot of non­
sense about the distinction between exceptions and 
reservations in grants. The elimination of the Rule 
in Shelley's Case will ultimately relieve us of quite 
a lot of law, and the abolition of the doctrine of the 
destructibility of contingent remainders has thrown 
a large chunk of abstruse learning into the discard, 
for practical purposes. The phrase "for practical 
purposes" must be added, in recognition of the 
tendency that many of us have to hang onto these 
beautifully senseless bits of ancient lore. We have, 
in the academic tradition, a fundamental aversion 
to statutes. Somehow they are not as worthy of con­
sideration as the basic common law, even though 
the statutes may be wholly in control of the situa­
tion. The academic law of personal property goes 
on with its foxes, deer, and fish, in blissful disregard 
of the game laws.16 We don't disregard statutes de­
claring contingent remainders indestructible, but 
they annoy us some because they interfere with the 
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proper teaching of the doctrine. Very likely I'm be­
ing a little unfair here. There are excuses. We say 
we teach the foxes and fish, not for love of the ani­
mals themselves but to introduce the concept of 
possession. We teach the destruction of contingent 
remainders because it is a good device for distin­
guishing contingent remainders from executory in­
terests. But we should be careful with the excuses; 
if a concept finds its chief justification in the resolu­
tion of issues which are largely dead, is not the 
utility of the concept itself in question? 
Unwillingness to get into the spirit of statutory 
change is not confined to the teaching profession. 
Some courts, for example, seem not quite ready to 
believe in the free alienability of future interests, 
despite statutes which clearly were designed to ef­
fect that result." 
I think it's worth noting that our situation with 
respect to the statutory modification of property 
law is vastly different from that of the English. Al­
most from the beginning we have been wearing 
the cast-off "property" of our older English broth­
ers. Real Property Commissioners were appointed 
in England as early as 1829. Although they reported 
that their law appeared "to come almost as near to 
perfection as can be expected in any human institu­
tions," 1S they nevertheless had some suggestions 
for changes. The English have been at it fairly regu­
larly ever since; and in 1925 they enacted seven sep­
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arate statutes, running to some seven hundred 
pages, which can be described as a truly sweeping 
revision of their law of property.19 Compared to 
that, anything which has been done in this country 
is mere fiddling with detail. The object of the Eng­
lish Acts was to make land as freely transferable as 
personal property. While they did not, and prob­
ably in the nature of things could not, get that re­
sult, they apparently did succeed in freeing land 
from a lot of the historical rigmarole which had im­
peded its transfer. It is a little difficult for us to 
imagine there being only one legal freehold estate 
in land—the fee simple—with such things as life 
estates and future interests relegated to the status 
of equitable rights only, but that has been the case in 
England for more than a generation. 
It is remarkable, but perhaps not strange, that so 
little attention has been paid to that legislation in 
this country. After a short flurry in the law reviews 
at the time of its adoption, little more has been 
heard of it. I suppose, with fifty separate jurisdic­
tions to contend with, anything like that may be 
over ambitious. 
3. A third process by which property law is being 
simplified, a process less obvious than statutory 
change but nevertheless effective, is simply further 
analysis. Someone perceives that two or more doc­
trines, previously treated as separate, are essentially 
the same thing; or that some set of rules, customarily 
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stated in a complicated way, can be more easily, and 
perhaps more effectively, stated in a simpler way; 
or that certain black-letter statements, generally 
regarded as rules of law, should be abandoned alto­
gether as a hopeless attempt to handle some aspects 
of the construction of instruments; or that some sup­
posed rule has been completely swallowed by its 
generally recognized exceptions. Having come to a 
conclusion of this kind, the discoverer asserts it, in a 
judicial opinion or elsewhere. If he's right, and if 
his analysis is read by enough people, it may, after 
many years, catch on. 
This kind of thing has happened several times in 
the law of property, as I suppose it has elsewhere. 
And it is continuing. One may cite, as a very gen­
eralized example, the progressive integration of the 
law of real and personal property. Virtually all of 
the current casebooks are labeled simply "Cases 
on Property." The degree of integration inside the 
covers varies considerably. The merger, to the ex­
tent that it is possible, will have to be, it seems to 
me, on a fairly high level of principles; it will have 
to rest on the realization that basic concepts of own­
ership, and basic devices by which ownership is 
transferred from one person to another, are the 
same, whether the object is something which we 
can move about more or less at will, or is space on 
the earth which moves only according to the laws of 
the universe. Land and automobiles can never be 
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made identical; and, because of the obvious differ­
ences, it is likely that each will continue to present 
its peculiar problems. There are, however, basic 
identities in the realm of legal theory. It is profita­
ble to assert these identities as an end in itself, quite 
apart from any consideration of the crowded condi­
tion in the curricula of law schools. The process of 
the merger of the law of real and personal property 
would be greatly facilitated if we could ever bring 
ourselves really to bury the forms of action. Why, 
after more than a hundred years, do we continue to 
talk about trover and trespass? Why do we recover 
the "possession" of personal property in an action 
in "replevin" and of real property in an action in 
"ejectment?" There are answers to these questions. 
One may be that it's not conventional to bury peo­
ple who aren't dead, and these gentlemen are not. 
The Ohio Code, for example, after stating that 
"there shall be but one form of action, to be known 
as a civil action," now adds, "this section does not 
affect any substantive right or liability, legal or 
equitable."20 This disclaimer was not in the section 
as originally enacted.21 To one for whom the dis­
tinction between substantive rights and procedural 
remedies has become rather thoroughly blurred, 
this section now seems to announce that there will 
be a funeral which will not be held. Probably I'm 
being unfair again, and I'd better leave this mat­
ter to someone who knows more about it. 
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A less ambitious instance of the reduction of the 
volume of property law by analysis can be found in 
that branch of it which relates to the so-called "in­
corporeal hereditaments." This, for practical pur­
poses, now means easements, profits, and the like. 
One doesn't have to look far, especially in the older 
cases, to find a series of dogmatic pronouncements 
relating to the assignability and divisibility of these 
interests: an easement in gross is not assignable;22 
a profit a prendre is assignable but not divisible;23 
an exclusive profit is both assignable and divisible.24 
It doesn't take a very searching examination of these 
cases to discover that what those rule makers were 
engaged in was a process of exaggerated overgen­
eralization. The failure of a red-haired plaintiff to 
recover in an action for personal injury does not jus­
tify a statement that a red-haired person cannot 
maintain a civil action, or even that he cannot main­
tain an action for personal injury. If one were to ask 
whether a particular red-haired person can main­
tain an action for a particular injury, the answer 
would have to be "it depends." It seems clear that a 
similar answer must be given when a question is 
raised as to the general transferability of one of 
these incorporeal interests. In some thirty pages the 
Property Restatement makes that answer: The as­
signability or divisibility of such an interest de­
pends, in its words, on "the manner or terms of its 
creation."25 It gives some recognition to the old 
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rules by way of presumptions. Notice that the result 
of this analysis was not only to simplify the state­
ment of the law, it also points out the essential dif­
ficulty of the problem. It says: "In order to answer 
this question you must look the instrument which 
created the interest fairly in the face and decide 
what it means. That may be hard to decide, but you 
can't avoid it by hiding from it." 
While analyzing these matters, those who drafted 
this part of the Restatement made a related dis­
covery. It is reported in a special note at the begin­
ning of the volume: 
Interests of the sort here discussed under the 
title "Easements" have traditionally been discussed 
under the separate titles of "Easements" and "Prof­
its." In phrasing the rules applicable to each of 
these interests it has been found, however, that in 
no case was there a rule applicable to one of these 
interests which was not also applicable to the other 
and since the rules with respect to both 
"easements" and "profits" can be stated in identical 
terms, it is much more convenient to use a single 
term to designate both interests. 2f> 
At the general meeting of the Institute which con­
sidered this matter, only one mild voice appears to 
have been raised in behalf of the profit a prendre, 
that of Henry Upson Sims of Alabama, who de­
scribed himself as tending "to be a fossiliferous 
lawyer." " 
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It is unfortunate, perhaps, that the Restaters 
felt their mandate did not permit them to discard 
the entire classification of interests as being either 
corporeal or incorporeal. They did go so far as to 
state, by way of comment, that the separation could 
not be defended on analytical grounds.28 I shall 
have more to say about that. 
The law of Bailments has been the subject of so 
much joking reproach I hesitate to say anything 
about it. It is the Brooklyn of the Law. At the be­
ginning of the century it weighed slightly less than 
four pounds in printed form;29 but its structural 
defects are now generally recognized, I believe. It's 
not unfair to designate it as a hodge-podge of un­
related questions which scholars, out of love for the 
Roman Law, attempted to hold together by con­
fused concepts and proliferated truisms. When I 
rent afloor sander I'm engaged in a locatio et con­
ductio rei bailment. I'm not certain it's even nice to 
know that. 
All of this may have been over long; and, you may 
properly think, not very closely related to the sub­
ject. I can only say in defense that it seems to me one 
cannot adequately consider any particular problem 
of property law unless he understands that he is 
stepping into an evolutionary process which has 
been very slow and which, at least to an outsider, 
would appear to be almost without sensible direc­
tion. Inertia, mistakes, a mixture of contradictory 
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theories—these are to be expected. Adverse pos­
session may have had even more than its fair share. 
Ownership 
The "bundle-of-sticks" theory of property, or of 
ownership, has not been challenged seriously, so far 
as I know, by anyone who has been exposed to it. 
It's hardly a theory at all, in the sense of being an 
intellectual tour de force which will lead to more 
and more new answers. It's not relativity or evolu­
tion. It's hardly more than an obvious statement of 
what we are doing. 
According to this notion, the concept of private 
property which exists in relation to some physical 
entity is just the totality of all the legally enforcea­
ble rights which a person, or persons, has with re­
spect to that entity. Wesley N. Hohfeld didn't in­
vent that idea; it was in current use long before his 
time.30 But he certainly perceived it clearly. I 
shouldn't want to get into an argument with you, or 
Hohfeld, or anyone else, about my use of the word 
"rights" in this connection. Hohfeld's analysis, as 
you know, has a terminology which includes 
"rights," "privileges," "powers," "immunities," "no-
rights," and such like. Many people have found 
the detailed application of these terms helpful. 
Whether they are or not makes no difference here. 
I don't believe my point requires that degree of 
precision. So I ask you to allow me to use the word 
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"rights" for the whole string of them. If you wish to 
pursue the distinctions you can substitute the 
proper term in the proper place. Apparently there 
is no single term which very well embraces them 
all and I don't want to keep repeating "rights, privi­
leges, powers and immunities" every sentence or so. 
The nature of what I'll call the Hohfeldian con­
cept of ownership is indicated by the following, 
which is not a quotation from Hohfeld at all, but 
rather from Walter Wheeler Cook:31 
Even in the work on Jurisprudence itself S al­
mond completely fails in certain chapters to show 
an appreciation of the meaning of these funda­
mental conceptions. Consider, for example, the fol­
lowing passage from the chapter on "Ownership": 
"Ownership in its most comprehensive signifi­
cation, denotes the relation between a person and 
any right that is vested in him. That which a man 
owns is in all cases a right. When, as is often the 
case, we speak of the ownership of a material ob­
ject, this is merely a convenient figure of speech. 
To own a piece of land means in truth to own a 
particular kind of right in the land, namely the fee 
simple of it." 
From the point of view of one who understands 
the meaning of the eight fundamental legal con­
cepts, it would be difficult to pen a more erroneous 
passage. To say that A owns a piece of land is 
really to assert that he is vested by the law with a 
complex—exceedingly complex, be it noted—ag­
gregate of legal rights, privileges, powers and im­
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munities—all relating of course to the land in 
question. He does not own the rights, etc., he has 
them; because he has them he "owns" in very 
truth the material object concerned; there is no 
"convenient figure of speech" about it. To say that 
A has a fee simple in a piece of land is, therefore, 
to say not that he owns a particular kind of right 
in the land but simply that he has a very complex 
aggregate of rights, privileges, powers and immu­
nities, available against a large and indefinite num­
ber of people, all of which rights, etc., naturally 
have to do with the land in question. 
I'd like to say a few things about this. I'd like to 
say them as preparation for consideration of the 
concept of possession: 
First: To get the most out of the "bundle-of­
sticks" idea it is important to note, as Cook did in 
the quotation above, the tremendous complexity of 
the rights involved. If we pose the case of a man 
who owns a house and lot in fee simple, the number 
of things he can do in relation to the house and lot, 
each one of which the law protects, is limited only 
by his imagination—or perhaps, in this discussion, 
by ours. The sticks in his bundle are very, very 
numerous. He can sit in the living room, he can 
snooze on the terrace, he can play the hi-fi within 
the limits of nuisance—and on, and on, and on. Fur­
ther, after all of those specialized sticks have been 
enumerated, the total number must be multiplied 
by the number of segments of time between now 
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and eternity—for remember, our friend has a fee 
simple and, as every schoolboy knows, those things 
are durable. 
All of the sticks he has represent rights against 
other persons. That means that no one else can law­
fully do a single one of those things at any time from 
now on, unless he has somehow acquired a particular 
stick from the former "haver." If our friend, who 
still holds the stick representing snoozing on the 
terrace, comes home and finds someone else snooz­
ing there he will know that there has been an in­
fringement of a right and that the law makes reme­
dies available to him. 
Second: This bundle-of-sticks notion has the de­
cided advantage of taking away from the concept of 
ownership the mystic quality that might otherwise 
be imparted to it, and frequently is imparted to it. 
A can recover a car from B because he owns the 
car. X can recover land from Y because X has the 
title. This is pure tautology. Since ownership means 
the right to recover, it's saying that A can recover 
from B because A can recover from B, and X can 
recover from Y because X can recover from Y. 
Similarly, the maxim of the common law, so fre­
quently found in property cases, sometimes even in 
Latin, that one may not use his own property to the 
injury of any legal right of another is merely say­
ing that one may not do what he may not do. Once 
this tautology is removed there is no hiding from 
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the fact that a policy decision has been made. 
Somehow it has been determined that certain per­
sons have certain rights with respect to certain 
things. We have the institution of private property. 
The problem is to determine what the rights are. 
Third: The simple idea that ownership is nothing 
but a large number of separable rights which we 
have chosen to bestow on certain persons, however 
obvious it may be, has not been accepted readily. 
We can read it, or listen to it, and agree with it; 
but when the opportunity arises we are very apt to 
revert to a more conventional and fuzzier usage, to 
our considerable analytical disadvantage. We yield 
to the feeling that ownership is a single thing which 
must be found in a single place. We don't "own" the 
house we live in; Jones "owns" it, we "rent" it. Such 
popular usage in everyday affairs may be defended, 
of course; but the tendency to think that way has 
not been confined to the man in the street. The law 
is full of it. The Property Restatement, after adopt­
ing the Hohf eldian terminology with great precision 
at the beginning of Volume I,32 tells us, in Volume 
V, that "incorporeal interests such as easements are 
rights in the land of another."33 Williston defines a 
bailment as "the rightful possession of goods by one 
who is not the owner."3i Holdsworth, writing ten 
years after Hohfeld, says there are many cases in 
which the possessor of property is not the owner 
and this is, in part, because "persons lend, or let, or 
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deposit their things."3B Clearly these statements as­
sume either that ownership is a single stick, or that 
it is a bundle so tightly bound it cannot be opened. 
Fourth: The theory that property, or owner­
ship, consists of rights which have somehow been 
conferred on persons with respect to certain ob­
jects or areas seems adequate for its limited job. 
Given what I have called the policy determination 
as to what the rights shall be, we can take care of 
the technical details by keeping a sharp eye out for 
the location of each of the sticks at any particular 
time. But there is an interloper here, another candi­
date for conceptual recognition. His name is "pos­
session" and we have seen examples of his capacity 
for interference in the quotations just given. It may 
be that historically possession was in command of 
the field, and ownership was the interloper. In any 
event thefight has been on for some time. 
Possession 
Holmes began his rather famous lecture on Pos­
session with a typical pronouncement: "Possession 
is a conception which is only less important than 
contract."36 Salmond went one step further: "There 
is no conception more difficult than that of pos­
session [and] its practical importance is not 
less than its difficulty."8T These gentlemen were not 
talking in the vein of the popular saying that posses­
sion is nine points of the law, which, I take it, re­
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fers to the fact that a person who has the burden of 
changing things is at a disadvantage; they were 
talking, rather, about a full-blown philosophical 
concept. 
There is no doubt of the difficulty involved in 
the concept of possession; and if the criterion were 
the weight of the literature on the subject, one 
might well conclude that Holmes and Salmond 
were right as to its significance. If you will go 
through the "Special Note on Possession" in Brown's 
excellent little book on Personal Property38 and look 
up all the works he cites, then look up all the works 
cited in the works he cites, you will have some 
understanding of the quantity of thick-lensed schol­
arship that has gone into this matter. There is some­
thing about the word "possession" that is like the 
mountain that is there to be climbed; we just have 
to have a go at it. The Romans did it, the English 
have done it, and the Germans have had more fun 
than anybody. For fifty years or so after Holmes's 
lecture there was much of it in the American law 
reviews. Bingham, Bordwell, and Ballantine, the 
three B's of the subject, accounted among them, for 
many, many pages of really admirable analysis pub­
lished in the ten years between 1915 and 1925.39 
Bordwell and Ballantine should perhaps be segre­
gated since their concern was with adverse posses­
sion rather than with the pure subject. For Bingham 
I shall always have a special fondness for having 
come up with the term "possessorship." 
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I have no ambition to add anything to the litera­
ture on possession; and I suppose we cannot sub­
tract from it directly, although the processes of dis­
card to which I referred earlier are operating upon 
it. Nevertheless, we are still in the hands of the 
philosophers. In particular, we are in the hands of 
Holmes, to a greater extent than most of us realize. 
"The business of the jurist," Holmes says, "is to 
make known the content of the law; that is to work 
upon it from within, or logically, arranging and dis­
tributing it, in order, from its summum genus to its 
infima species, so far as practicable."i0 "The first call 
of a theory of law is that it should fit the facts."41 
Accordingly, the problem is to take the "legislation," 
which means the statutes and decided cases, and 
fit them into a generalized pattern revealing what 
has happened and what will happen. With this goal 
Holmes looks at the possession cases and defines the 
concept in a way which he believes best fits the 
facts. He observes that the law has protected pos­
session; that is, it has allowed possessors to maintain 
actions against others without regard to whether 
the possessor was also owner. To the German phi­
losophers this was because the ultimate end was the 
vindication of the free will of man, and when a man 
willed to exercise control over an object that will 
was to be enforced. So, for them, the important in­
gredient of possession was the intent on the part of 
the possessor to make the object his, the intent to 
deal with it as owner. Thus, with an assist from a 
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unitary notion of ownership, the German theorist, 
in two short steps, gets from the free will of man to 
the conclusion that a bailee does not have posses­
sion. 
This, for Holmes, won't do. The theory must fit 
the facts and his facts are the English common law. 
The law enables the possessor to prevent interfer­
ence by others, so the intent which is required for 
possession is the intent which parallels the operation 
of the law, i.e., the intent to exclude others. The 
common law protects a person who has the intent to 
exclude others because people are just born fighters. 
Holmes puts it this way: 
It is quite enough . for the law, that man, 
by an instinct which he shares with the domestic 
dog, and of which the seal gives a most striking 
example, will not allow himself to be dispossessed, 
either by force or fraud, of what he holds without 
trying to get it back again. Philosophy may find 
a hundred reasons to justify the instinct, but it 
would be totally immaterial if it should condemn 
it and bid us surrender without a murmur. As long 
as the instinct remains it will be more comfortable 
for the law to satisfy it in an orderly manner, than 
leave people to themselves.42 
So—and these are my words, not Holmes's—the 
law wants to prevent ruckuses; therefore, it extends 
its protection to the man who would otherwise 
create a ruckus, namely, the man who is in control 
of something with the intention to exclude others. 
PROPERTY, POLICY, AND POSSESSION 37 
Therefore, possession, as an organizing concept, 
means a physical control with the intent to exclude 
others. 
Section 7 of the Restatement of the Law of Prop­
erty is as follows: 
A possessory interest in land exists in a person 
who has . a physical relation to the land of a 
kind which gives a certain degree of physical con­
trol over the land, and an intent so to exercise such 
control as to exclude other members of society 
in general from any present occupation of the 
land. 
Holmes wrote it, you see, in 1881. This section 
of the Restatement was among his posthumously 
published works. 
Now, one doesn't set up the pins in the alley 
without rolling a ball or two, and I intend to do so. 
One can point out that the extensive generalization 
of the term "possession" must result, inevitably, in 
leaving out the really significant factors bearing on 
any particular case. You cannot successfully lump 
together the capture of whales, the commission of 
larceny, and the maintaining of an action in eject­
ment. Any concept which purports to do so is cer­
tain to be almost without meaningful content. Pro­
fessor Shartel made this point admirably in a paper 
delivered at a meeting of the Association of Ameri­
can Law Schools in 1931.43 It can also be pointed 
out, as Shartel did, that even in a narrower field none 
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of the generalized theories of possession really does 
fit the facts, in Holmes's sense. A servant who has 
goods of his master's, and who belligerently intends 
to exclude others, does not have possession by the 
common law; and Holmes is forced to explain this 
as historical accident.44 However, the basic quarrel 
with the possession theorists seems to me to be on a 
broader front. They have made the concept respect­
able, when, as an analytical tool, it doesn't deserve 
to be. 
Possession, as an organizing concept, is simply a 
primitive form of the concept of ownership. It has 
been pointed out repeatedly that this is so.45 Owner­
ship is a little difficult to handle when people gen­
erally cannot read and write. Possession is an ob­
vious answer. What we have of possession in our 
present law is vestigial; it is the tailbone of property. 
It doesn't aid the concept of ownership, it disturbs 
it. It is responsible for the distinction between cor­
poreal and incorporeal interests, which is wasted ef­
fort; ownership could handle the matter without the 
distinction. It has led to some fantastic results, such 
as the rule, now happily well along toward obliv­
ion, that an owner of land cannot transfer it while 
it is in the adverse possession of someone else. It 
forces us to secure obvious results by devious and 
almost laughable means, such as saying that X is in 
"constructive" possession of a tract of land when 
actually he is not there and all that differentiates X 
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from the rest of the world is that he happens to own 
the land. It enables the American Law Institute to 
produce the phrase "non-dispossessory trespass."46 
In nearly all cases, analysis could have proceeded 
much more expeditiously, it seems to me, if we 
hadn't constantly stumbled over "possession." There 
is, of course, one class of cases which ownership 
won't explain. If one believes the black-letter type, 
the law protects pure possession, unrelated to own­
ership, against intrusions by anyone except the 
owner. These cases are the ones, of course, on which 
the possession theorists feasted. As to these, I ask 
two questions: First, to what extent do we really 
protect pure possession? Second, to the extent that 
we do, why do we want to do it? 
The first question I raise merely to point out that 
some cases, such as those of the foxes, deer, and fish, 
and most bailees, can be handled on ownership 
grounds. How many thieves recover for conversion 
by other thieves? How many adverse possessors 
actually become successful plaintiffs before the 
statute has run? Concededly, some have. I have 
made no counts, I merely ask the questions. 
To whatever extent we do protect pure posses­
sion, divorced from ownership, we do it, I believe, 
not because we want to but because we simply 
haven't taken the trouble to stop. Holmes's notion 
that we do it to prevent dog fights may be ques­
tionable on logical grounds; but, in any event, it's 
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hardly a compliment to the modern police depart­
ment.47 The idea that we do it in order to protect 
real owners by relieving them of the necessity of 
proving their titles may have more to it, but the 
loss of that advantage would be a small price for 
relieving the rest of the law. 
Possession, as an organizing concept, is on the 
way to oblivion. Likely we'll all get there first; but 
I, for one, would be glad to give it a ride if I could. 
II 
Adverse Possession: The Law 
ADVERSE POSSESSION is a traditional, and *- still common, subdivision of the book-law of 
property. Although its relative bulk in the legal 
literature is small, there is not sufficient time, in a 
presentation such as this, to attempt a full-scale tra­
ditional consideration of it; nor would it be ap­
propriate to do so. But it will be useful, I believe, to 
examine briefly the major outline of the law of ad­
verse possession, noting, as we go along, some of the 
processes by which this law has been developed and 
some of the divergence and confusion which these 
processes have produced. 
In the first part of this discussion it was sug­
gested that possession, as an organizing concept in 
property law, is more of a hindrance than an aid 
and, accordingly, we would be better off without it. 
This, of course, referred to the "possession" of the 
legal theorist, the combination of corpus and animus 
which may have been of better service to the Ro­
mans than it is to us. It had nothing to do with the 
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corpus alone, the observable fact which occurs 
when a person goes upon land, puts a twelve-foot 
fence around it, digs up every square foot of it for 
the cultivation of gourds, and constantly patrols the 
fence, rifle in hand. Physical events involving a per­
son and land are bound to happen; if they did not 
there would be nothing for us to talk about. Fur­
ther, it is going to happen that some persons will do 
some things with respect to some lands, which 
things, under our convention of ownership, they 
have no right to do. In this sense there will always 
be possession and adverse possession; but this means 
only that, in the property field, as elsewhere, peo­
ple will be doing what they have a right to do and 
also, sometimes, what they have no right to do, an 
observation which is not likely to shock anyone. 
Dealing with people who have done, or are do­
ing, what they have no right to do is one of the com­
mon aspects of the law's business. Since ownership 
of land means, among other things, rights to use it 
presently, the person who makes use of land, with­
out having the right, may find the forces of the law 
thrown against him. He may find himself liable for 
damages; he may find himself removed from the 
land; he may face an order to stop doing what he 
has been doing. All this is basic operation to which 
a law student becomes accustomed in a few days. 
When he discovers that the law, by statutes of limi­
tations, and other devices, places time restrictions 
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on its operation, he is likely to accept it without 
much disturbance. He can satisfy himself as to the 
reason, if indeed he feels the need of any, by repeat­
ing some meaningless phrase such as "the rejection 
of stale claims." After all, it crops up everywhere 
and it must be right. But it would be quite a tribute 
to the imperturbability of anyone if he could accept 
the subject of adverse possession without wonder­
ing what is going on. We have a statute limiting the 
bringing of a cause of action for slander to one year 
after the cause of action accrues;48 but we don't 
have whole chapters in texts and casebooks and 
whole titles in legal encyclopedias to explain it. We 
just have it, and that's that. Why are things differ­
ent when we are concerned with the recovery of 
property? Why the heading, "Adverse Possession"? 
When we move into the chapter or the title, we find 
that the material there, while constantly referring 
to the statute of limitations, appears most of the 
time to be talking about something else. While stat­
ing that the doctrine is fundamentally based on the 
operation of the Statute in limiting actions to re­
cover the possession of land to twelve, or fifteen, or 
twenty years after the cause of action arose, the law 
appears to be that the statutes do not mean what 
they say. When they do operate, they do not merely 
bar the cause of action, in the legal way of saying 
things; they go further and give the possessor "title" 
to the land. But this will not occur, nor will the 
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cause of action be barred, unless the activities of 
the wrongdoer have conformed to a list of explosive 
adjectives. In order to ripen into title, we are told, 
the possession must be open, notorious, continuous, 
hostile, and adverse. To the uninitiated this must 
sound more like grounds for divorce than property 
law. Sometimes it is added that it also must be un­
der claim of right, claim of title and color of title. 
Having been told that all this notorious hostility 
is required, the student will be further puzzled 
when he encounters an early American case holding, 
in effect, that Indians were incapable of exercis­
ing i t  -
Superficially, anyway, the books seem to be say­
ing that the statute doesn't mean what it says; there 
may be cases in which a cause of action has existed 
for longer than the period stated in the statute, and 
still not be barred. And this seems to be true. In 
Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, the case detailed earlier,60 
it must be that there was a cause of action against 
the Lutzes from 1912 on; yet in 1952 they were or­
dered to clear out. A full hundred years before the 
Lutzes built "Charlie's House" John Marshall said: 
"One of [the rules] which has been recognized in 
the courts of England, and in all others where the 
rules established in those courts have been adopted, 
is that possession, to give title, must be adversary. 
The word is not, indeed, to be found in the statutes; 
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but the plainest dictates of common justice require 
that it be implied."61 
Why so? Why should so many legislatures have 
omitted a point so plain? 
It is possible to take the position that the whole 
matter really is nothing but the operation of the 
Statutes of Limitations, as written; that there is 
nothing else; and that the trouble comes largely 
from gratuitous statements in the cases. This posi­
tion is essentially that taken in the section dealing 
with adverse possession in the American Law of 
Property, which is perhaps the best over-all recent 
analysis of the subject.62 On the other hand, it is pos­
sible to contend that the injection of the Statute of 
Limitation into the subject has just confused things. 
Thus, in a note appearing in the Property Restate­
ment, it is said: "It is an anomaly of the law that a 
doctrine whose chief importance is the creation of 
interests by adverse possession should be couched 
in terms of extinguishment of remedies. It is 
significant that this branch of the law is commonly 
described and indexed as adverse possession.'"63 
Each of these positions can call upon history for 
support; and each of them must explain certain 
cases either as "erroneous," or, like Holmes, as "his­
torical accidents." For the most part, the courts and 
the text writers have not taken either position ex­
plicitly, nor have they recognized the divergence. 
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The law of adverse possession is taken as an estab­
lished unit; and, in deciding questions one at a time, 
or in treating them textually one at a time, the ques­
tion of internal consistency is not raised. Further, 
the divergence of view leads to differences only on 
certain questions; on others there is harmonious 
concert. 
In one of the works to which I have just referred 
the statement is made, with reference to the doc­
trine of adverse possession, that, "here, as in all law, 
the true approach is the historical one." M A state­
ment of this kind always is a little puzzling. If A 
says, "What is the explanation of such-and-such a 
rule?", and B says, "The explanation is historical," 
B may be perfectly correct; and, in that sense, he 
may be making the "true approach." What he is 
saying though, when he says the explanation is his­
torical, is that the rule was designed for conditions 
which no longer exist, and has no present justifica­
tion. Thus, he can hardly say that the rule now rep­
resents the "true approach" to the problem. No one 
would say, in so many words, that a rule is good be­
cause it once was so, although some of us come 
perilously close to it at times. If, on the other hand, 
what is meant by the assertion that the historical 
approach is the true one, is that some inquiry into 
the rule's past may give a better basis for judging its 
present worth, then one can't quarrel seriously with 
the statement. There is nothing to lose but the time 
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spent in making the inquiry. With that understood, 
and with no pretence to write the history of the doc­
trine, let's make a spot check on it. 
Some History 
It is common to begin discussions of adverse pos­
session with the English Statute of Limitations of 
1623, adding fleeting reference to a couple of tem­
porary acts which preceded it.55 This, in itself, re­
flects our innate conviction that possessory rights 
are one thing and non-possessory rights basically 
something else. Adverse possession is one thing; 
prescription is another. This obscures the close, and 
somewhat instructive, relation between the two. 
Prescription, if not as old as sin, is as old as any­
one could wish. The Romans had it, and it appeared 
in England at least by the Twelfth Century.56 It, too, 
is a product of the dominance of the concept of pos­
session. With respect to land, at least, possession was 
represented by the concept of seisin. Possession and 
seisin are synonymous. Maitland says so;" Holds-
worth says so;58 and I accept it, although there are 
dissenters.69 Seisin was transferred by the familiar 
livery of seisin, the symbolic delivery of a clod or 
other thing representing the land. It was a unitary 
concept; a person either had it or he didn't. Never­
theless, there were situations in which one person 
wished to transfer to another a right to make some 
minor use of his land, such as a right of way. This 
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could not be done by livery of seisin, which would 
have passed the whole thing; it had to be accom­
plished by "grant" which, in the peculiar way of 
Twelfth Century Englishmen, was regarded as a 
device by which the person seized set up a little 
body of law for the government of his land.60 Accord­
ingly, we have the familiar proposition that corpo­
real interests lie in livery, but incorporeal interests 
lie in grant. If a person was in fact making use of a 
way, or engaged in some similar activity, and his 
right to do so was challenged, he could defend by 
showing a grant, or by showing a general custom in 
the community to make use of it, or, alternatively, 
he could "prescribe," that is, he could show that he 
or his predecessors had used the way for a period 
extending beyond the time of legal memory. The 
beginning of memory came to be established at the 
year 1189, the beginning of the reign of Richard I. 
To "prescribe" meant merely to claim on long usage. 
As things went along, two things happened to this 
theory: First, the law's memory became too long 
and courts began to adopt other periods by analogy 
—at first the periods of the temporary statutes re­
lating to the time within which seisin could be as­
serted, and later the period of the Statute of Limita­
tions. Second, under the notion that incorporeal 
interests lay in grant, the theory came to be that the 
process of "prescribing" amounted to an assertion 
that there had been a grant. After the necessary 
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lapse of time there was a presumption that it had 
been lost. The courts may well have been entirely 
honest about this. There were no vaults or micro­
films; old scribblings likely were thrown away by 
those who couldn't read; and it was conventional for 
the whole town to burn down at intervals. At any 
rate, it was a rebuttable presumption. Evidence 
could be produced to show that, in fact, there had 
been no grant. A showing that the use of the way 
had been furtive, or that the user had in some 
other manner indicated that he had no right, tended 
to show there had been no grant. Accordingly, the 
rule, which it is said Bracton copied from the Ro­
man Law,61 came to be that a right could not be ac­
quired by prescription unless the long use had been 
open and as of right. 
All of this was established by the time of the en­
actment of the Statute of Limitations in 1623.62 The 
theory of the statute, which related to actions to 
recover the possession of land, was not that there 
had been a livery of seisin and, after a lapse of a pe­
riod of time, it would be presumed that the evi­
dence was lost; it was rather that the person who in 
fact had the seisin, whether he had acquired it 
rightfully or wrongfully, would be protected by the 
lapse of time from an action to recover it. The 
statute barred the remedy; there was no presump­
tion of right involved. Indeed it appears that for a 
considerable time after the enactment of the statute, 
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the "true" owner, if he managed to reacquire pos­
session of the land, could retain it against the person 
in whose favor the statute previously had run.63 But 
this view changed, and in 1833 the Real Property 
Limitation Act64 provided that the running of the pe­
riod of limitation should extinguish the right as well 
as the remedy of the previous owner. The same pro­
vision is included in the English Limitation Act of 
1939.65 
The term "adverse possession" seems first to have 
been used by Lord Mansfield in 1787.66 No great 
blame should attach to him for this. It is an obvious 
phrase, especially when used, as Mansfield did use 
it, to indicate merely that the Statute of Limitations 
does not run in favor of a person who has a right to 
do what he is doing. The phrase has become statu­
tory in England and appears in the present legisla­
tion; 67 but it seems clear that it carries little more 
meaning than that originally attributed to it by 
Lord Mansfield and it has been said that, while it 
has introduced some circularity in thinking, it has 
not proved troublesome in practice.68 
In America, however, the adjectives and phrases 
qualifying the nature of the possession required in 
order to work the magic, appeared at an early date. 
In 1715 the colonial legislature of North Carolina 
passed an act which, in its first two sections, vali­
dated certain irregular deeds, and, in its third sec­
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tion, provided that no person should recover the 
possession of lands except within seven years after 
the right accrued.69 A controversy arose as to 
whether the seven-year limitation applied to every­
one or, in view of the first two sections of the act, 
only to those who entered under some sort of deed. 
When it is remembered that North Carolina then ex­
tended to the Mississippi, it can be seen that they 
may well have had some problems. In 1797 an act 
was passed to settle the controversy, the effect of 
which act was that the seven-year limitation was 
available only to those who entered under color of 
title, that is, some sort of purported conveyance. 
In the 1820's Marshall, as noted above, referred to 
the requirement that the possession must be "ad­
versary," 70 and during the same period Judge Dun­
can, in Pennsylvania, appears first to have strung 
the adjectives together: 
The act of limitations does not prevent the entry 
of the owner of the land, and bringing an eject­
ment at any time, unless where there has been an 
actual, continued, visible, notorious, distinct, and 
hostile possession for twenty-one years.71 
In the same case the trial court had referred to "ad­
versary possession" and a "claim of right." It seems, 
however, that these Pennsylvania judges, as well as 
Marshall, were presently concerned, as was Lord 
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Mansfield, with the proposition that the statute 
would not run in favor of a man who had a right to 
be on the land in the first place. 
In 1828, the phrase "adverse possession" and the 
stipulation that in order to qualify as such a particu­
lar holding must have been under "claim of title" 
were incorporated into the New York statutes,72 and 
the "claim of title" concept has since appeared in the 
statutory law of ten other states.73 This New York 
statute was the one which rose to plague the Lutzes 
in 1952. "Color of title" also appears rather fre­
quently in American statutes, usually in connection 
with a provision shortening the statutory period in 
cases where such "color" exists.74 
It has been surmised that the tendency of the 
early American law makers, judicial as well as legis­
lative, to heap more and more burdens on the pos­
sessor—requirements which he must satisfy before 
gaining title—can be attributed to large quantities 
of vacant land, large numbers of questioned titles, 
and a desire to support the latter.75 Like many such 
speculations, there may be something in it; but it is 
well not to be led into the belief that phenomena of 
this kind have a simple, single explanation. We have 
to add, at least, confusion with the rules of prescrip­
tion, failure to read statements in context, and over­
exposure to the philosophical theories of intent as 
an element of possession. In any event, and for 
whatever reason, an extensive use of modifiers rela­
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tive to wrongful possession did come about, and the 
modifiers continue to appear in judicial opinions, 
often without any relation to the question to be de­
cided. 
The periods of limitation prescribed by the stat­
utes vary widely, and there has been a tendency to 
shorten them. The English statute, which originally 
provided for a twenty year limitation on actions to 
recover land, is now twelve years.76 In New York 
the period was reduced from twenty to fifteen 
years.77 The Ohio limitation, on the contrary, was 
increased at an early date from twenty to twenty-
one years.78 The obsession with the figure twenty-
one continues to intrigue me. 
"Title" 
The things which have gone on with respect to 
the effect of adverse possession on the so-called 
"title" to the land involved represent, I should say, 
property law at its worst. Theories of possession and 
ownership have become involved in a brawl, the 
dust from which obscures any real question which 
may be present. 
How can a statute which merely purports to bar 
the remedy of a plaintiff give title to a defendant? 
It should be noted that there is no disagreement at 
all on the outcome. Where land is held by an ad­
verse possessor, however he is defined, and the pe­
riod of the statute of limitations has run, the ad­
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verse possessor does have "title" to the land; he 
"owns" it and there's nothing the former owner or 
anyone else can do about it. It is not a "derivative" 
title, it is an "original" one. On the one hand, the 
attitude is that this is a mystery; it is something the 
courts have done by applying their own doctrine of 
adverse possession in the interpretation of a statute 
which says nothing about it; it is an extension of the 
statute. In the words of one writer, the statute has 
been "construed to transfer the title to the adverse 
possessor so as to enable him to assert his owner­
ship against the world, including the original 
owner."79 On the other hand, it is asserted that there 
is no mystery about it; the answer is to be found in 
history, which is the true approach; a wrongful pos­
sessor of land is the owner—he has the seisin and 
can hold it against everyone except the true owner, 
who has only a cause of action. When that cause of 
action is eliminated by the running of the statute of 
limitations there is then nothing which can inter­
fere with the enjoyment of the land by the former 
adverse possessor and the game is simply over.80 
All of this, in my view, comes to nothing. On 
some basis, a decision has been made that a person 
who occupies another person's land for ever-so­
many years shall own it. That decision is virtually on 
a level with the decision that enabled anyone to own 
it in the first place. If I can use that "word" again, it 
is a "policy" decision. No amount of examining the 
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tools, such as "ownership" and "possession" by 
which we hope to put our policy decisions into effect 
is going to explain the basic decision; such an ex­
amination only turns up defective tools. 
As mentioned earlier, the English have handled 
this matter in a way which puts it in its true place. 
The statute of 1833 simply provided that after the 
running of the period of the statute of limitations 
the right of the adverse possessor, as well as his 
remedy, is barred.81 Now it's obviously a policy de­
cision and they don't have to worry about how it 
can be. It should be added that there are a consid­
erable number of statutes in this country which do 
the same thing in so many words—more than some 
of the theorizers lead us to believe.82 
On another point involved in this "title" squab­
ble, the results themselves have not been entirely 
uniform nor happy. If possession is ownership— 
and, to paraphrase the seisin proponents, "has it ever 
been doubted that it is?"—then it follows that the 
adverse possessor, wrongful though he may be, is 
the owner. It also follows that the "true owner" is 
not the "owner." From that it follows that a con­
veyance by the "true owner" is ineffective because 
he had nothing to convey. At an early period in 
England, it was a fact that a person whose land was 
being held adversely by another could not make a 
conveyance. The conveyance would have had to 
have been by livery of seisin and one couldn't trans­
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fer seisin when he didn't have it. It is true that the 
owner could have resorted to the courts, while the 
statute had not yet run, and recover the posses­
sion; but this right was not a title, it was a right of 
entry, a mere cause of action. A cause of action 
could not be assigned.83 Supposedly there was a rea­
son for this beyond mere word-tossing and confusion 
as to ownership. According to Coke, "great per­
sons," by which I think he meant persons who had 
the power to influence the courts and were willing 
to do so, had formed the practice of buying up 
"pretended" claims and enforcing them in the courts 
to the disadvantage of the "weak."S4 In our terms, 
they had started a racket. So the English law went 
further and made this sort of thing a crime. We have 
here the origin of Champerty and Maintenance. 
None of this rigmarole bothered the English 
after 1845. They applied the usual remedy, at least 
so far as concerned the title to the land— a statute 
which made the interest of an owner out of posses­
sion alienable.85 But we have behaved in our usual 
way too; we have dragged our feet. 
If a student wants an answer to a point of law he 
asks the professor, or, better still, another student 
who has already had the course. He seldom looks it 
up. This habit of oral research is a bad one; it leads 
to the accumulation of inaccurate information. Can 
an owner who is out of possession make a valid con­
veyance? Let's look it up: 
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Of the three principal student texts on the law 
of Real Property, the first, in order of publication, 
says that in most states there are no restrictions on 
the power of such a dispossessed owner to effect a 
transfer.86 The second text says the general rule in 
this country is that a conveyance by an owner is in­
effective if, at the time of the conveyance, the land 
is held adversely by another person.87 The third says 
such a conveyance can be made, but that this an­
swer is an arbitrary one, there being many cases to 
the contrary.88 
The result of this bit of intensive scholarship is 
not to be attributed merely to a miscount of noses by 
one or more of the writers. The reason is our reluc­
tance to pay any attention to statutes and the felt 
need to state the law of fifty or so jurisdictions in 
one sweeping sentence. The writer who asserted 
that an owner out of possession cannot make an ef­
fective conveyance, cited cases from four states; in 
two of them statutes making such conveyances 
valid had already been enacted.89 The fact is that 
there are now six states in which these conveyances 
are declared by statute to be invalid.901 do not know 
whether the jails in these states are filled with 
champertors, but I doubt it. When New York aban­
doned a similar statute in 1941, there had not been a 
recorded prosecution for champerty in the state 
since 1830.91 In approximately thirty-five states the 
rule that there can be no effective conveyance by 
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an owner out of possession has been abrogated, 
sometimes by decision, but mostly by statute.92 
This leaves ten states, or so, unreported. If we must 
state the American law, and I see no real need to do 
so, why can't we put it that way? 
Ohio is one of the unreported states, and I 
shouldn't want to be the first person in more than a 
hundred and fifty years to raise the question. Vir­
tually the same question has been raised, but not 
answered with respect to the alienability of the 
other type of right of entry—the right of entry for 
condition broken, which is the interest retained by a 
person who creates a fee simple with condition sub­
sequent. Exactly the same senseless reasons for its 
being inalienable can be argued; and the fact that 
they are senseless may not be, and perhaps should 
not be, controlling for the careful lawyer. 
In at least one other type of problem the obses­
sion with "title" has impeded sensible reasoning. If 
A enters land belonging to B and damages it, say by 
removing valuable substances from it, he is, of 
course, liable to B. Suppose this activity continues 
until the statute of limitations has run so as to con­
fer title to the land on A; is A thereafter liable to B 
for the damage done while he, A, was an adverse 
possessor and, as yet, had no title? The tendency has 
been to attempt to answer this by the perfectly 
vacant assertion that title, once acquired by the 
adverse possessor, relates back to the time of his en­
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try; hence he was the owner all the time, and vio­
lated no rights of other people in treating the land 
as he did.93 It is obvious that if the answer is to be 
"no liability," nothing is added to the answer by 
adding "because of relation back." One could just as 
easily say that there is liability because there is no 
relation back. Things that happen on Saturday do 
not, in fact, happen on the preceding Tuesday. It 
may be permissible to pretend that they did for 
some good reason; but the fact that we are so pre­
tending is scarcely a reason that can be offered for 
the pretense. If we don't know the reason for giving 
title to the adverse possessor in the first place, we 
can scarcely know whether he should be held liable 
to the owner for interim damage to the land. 
Actual, Open, and Notorious 
So far as I know, no one has ever contested the 
proposition asserted in almost every adverse posses­
sion case in the books that such possession, in or­
der to ripen into title, must be actual, open, and 
notorious. If the proposition were that the posses­
sion would suffice even if it were phony, furtive, and 
in secret, it would be surprising. But one needn't be 
flip to assert that the words actual, open, and notori­
ous add virtually nothing to the analysis and might 
just as well be scuttled. 
When I say that the words add nothing I do not 
mean that there is no problem suggested by them, 
60 ADVERSE POSSESSION 
but merely that they don't supply the answer. Given 
a rule that adverse possession for a period of time 
produces such-and-such a result there obviously is 
a problem, not only of when possession is adverse, 
but also when possession is. The word "actual" 
means real, rather than potential; and it's clear we 
would be in quite a situation if potential adverse 
possession for, say, twenty-one years gave a title. So, 
on that basis, the requirement that the possession 
must be actual means only that the possession must 
be possession. If the statement is taken to mean that 
the possession must be actual as opposed to con­
structive then we are in two difficulties. In the first 
place, it seems to me that analysis of the phrase 
"constructive possession" will bring you to the con­
clusion that it means either no possession or just 
plain possession. If it means "no possession" then 
the principal proposition reads, "the possession 
must be possession and not no possession." If "con­
structive possession" means "possession" then we 
have the proposition "the possession must be pos­
session and not possession." That was all "in the first 
place" and probably is confusing if not fallacious. 
In the second place, if I'm wrong, and constructive 
possession means something which is neither ordi­
nary possession nor no possession, then the proposi­
tion that adverse possession, to be effective to create 
a title, must be ordinary possession, and not con­
structive, is simply not true. It is generally recog­
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nized that if X is in ordinary possession (whatever 
that means) of a part of a tract of land which be­
longs to someone else, and has an ineffective deed, 
i.e., color of title, to the entire tract, his adverse pos­
session is good for the entire tract; he has, they say, 
constructive possession of it.94 
If you will concede the point that the word "ac­
tual" adds nothing here, and I'm sure you will to 
avoid another go-round like that, the question nev­
ertheless remains as to what possession is in this 
context. And that is not an easy one. If we can 
imagine a movie camera trained on the piece of land 
in question and running continuously for twenty-
one years, and then the processed film run off before 
a jury for another twenty-one years, what would we 
tell them to look for? 
The New York legislature tried to answer this 
question, you remember, by the statutory require­
ment that there be either a finding that the premises 
were substantially inclosed, or that they were usu­
ally cultivated or improved.95 That's one of the 
things that defeated Mr. Lutz, although you may 
question the decision, as the dissent did. Several 
other states have copied those provisions,96 but most 
statutes offer no guides at all. In the absence of such 
a statute, the courts frequently say that those things 
—inclosure, cultivation, improvement—are evi­
dence of possession, but not requisites. The best 
anyone has been able to do by way of generalization, 
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is something like "the actual degree of control ordi­
narily exercised over such property by the average 
owner of it."97 If you lie awake nights you may 
want to try constructing some thought twisters out 
of that. I'll refrain for fear someone might ask me to 
do better. 
One more question: If a person lives on a portion 
of a tract of land and has a fence around the entire 
tract we'll assume, for immediate purposes anyway, 
that he has possession of the whole. Suppose he lives 
on the same portion and has no fence but has a deed 
for the entire tract; is the deed a fence? Does it 
make any difference if he is the only living person 
who knows about the deed? Are we back probing 
into his intent again on this "constructive posses­
sion" problem? I said one more question; there are 
three. I offer the other two in lieu of an answer. 
The possession must be "open and notorious." 
These two terms usually are used as though they 
were one word, in the way certain swear words are 
thrown together to form a single epithet. It's barely 
conceivable that a case might be made for the reten­
tion of the word notorious, on a ground which I 
shall consider later; but I know of no case which has 
been decided on the point that a particular posses­
sion, though open, was not publicly or generally 
known, which is the usual connotation of "notori­
ous." So let's discard it. 
Does the word "open" help us? If a particular 
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possession meets the test of being a possession—in 
the sense that we have just discussed it and vague 
as that test is—then it's difficult to see how it could 
avoid being "open." If we were to take the twenty-
one year movie, as we supposed, and the entire film 
showed nothing but desolate land, with no move­
ment other than that of the changing seasons and 
an occasional rabbit, we would say that there was 
no possession. It would take an extremely cautious 
person to conclude that if there was possession it 
was not open. 
Sometimes the requirement that the possession 
be open has been used, purportedly anyway, to de­
cide cases involving operations underground—not 
only mining, as you might think, but also exhibition 
caves.98 For the most part I believe those cases are 
faulty in analysis. The possession was open enough 
and the owner of the land knew about it. What he 
didn't know was that it was on his land; and that's 
part of another story which can occur on the surface 
as well. There's something about property law 
which makes it go crazy when it gets underground, 
to say nothing of its behavior in the air. 
The problem of the possession being open, even 
if that means something, is not the same here as it 
is in prescription. Even if it is conceded that a cer­
tain possessor is not being "open" in his behavior, 
we can't pounce on that as evidence that he is doing 
something he has no right to do, and so rebut the 
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presumption of a lost grant. Adverse possession does 
not operate on that presumption; it assumes that the 
possessor has no right to be there. 
So I'm here: To say that possession must be ac­
tual, open, and notorious is to say no more than that 
there must be possession. That in itself poses a prob­
lem, but the modifiers do not answer it. 
Continuous 
No doubt has been expressed by anyone that a 
possession, in order to evolve into ownership of the 
land in question, must be "continuous" for the pe­
riod of the statute. If A behaves in such a way that 
we will say he is in possession of B's land, and con­
tinues such behavior for, say, two years, and then 
stops, B's cause of action to recover the possession 
of the land has come to an end. If A, or for that mat­
ter someone else, should later begin the same be­
havior all over again, we would say, in the technical 
jargon of the law, that B now has a new cause of 
action and that the statute must begin running all 
over again. Absent an acceptance of any clear func­
tional mission of the general doctrine, this technical 
reasoning has been accepted, and the possession 
must be "continuous." 
Quite a bit of litigation, and considerable "put­
casing" has occurred over the so-called question of 
"tacking." Under what circumstances can the pos­
session of one person be added to that of another in 
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order to make out the period of the statute and pro­
duce the magic result? Here again the skirmish had 
to be on technical grounds; and almost uniformly 
the American cases have held that two or more suc­
cessive adverse possessions can be added together 
if there is "privity"—meaning a transfer—between 
the parties." So long as the possession is withheld 
from the owner as a result of the same ouster his 
cause of action continues and it makes no difference 
that the potential defendants may be different per­
sons. However, if there is no privity between the 
first adverse possessor and the second, then the sec­
ond adverse possessor has committed a new ouster; 
this gives rise to a new cause of action and the stat­
ute begins running afresh. It has been the English 
position, and Professor Ames believed them right,100 
that no privity is necessary in order to add succes­
sive possessions—all that is necessary is a continu­
ous possession in point of time so as to prevent "con­
structive" possession from re-attaching to the owner 
at the time of a break. It is said to be the usual, al­
though not universal, rule in this country that the 
requisite privity may be attained by any of the de­
vices recognized as effective to transfer ownership, 
but it also exists when there has been an oral trans­
fer of the possession—a sort of present-day livery of 
seisin.101 
When the question is prescription, rather than 
adverse possession, the "privity" matter is in a dif­
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ferent light. It may be said that prescription de­
mands privity in order to tack successive interests, 
since its basic theory, by presumption of a lost grant, 
is that the user is acting rightfully.102 
It is not likely that all this would be designated 
social engineering by anyone. 
Hostile-Claim of Right 
The supposed requirement that possession, in 
order to become a title, must be hostile, and the 
supposed requirement that it must be under a claim 
of right, may seem antithetical. Whether they are or 
not depends, of course, on the meaning that is at­
tached to them. It is convenient, in any event, to 
treat them together. 
A word, first, about the frequency with which 
these stated requirements appear. The adjective 
"hostile" appears in virtually all of the adverse pos­
session cases there are in the country. This is a 
sweeping statement but I believe the facts will come 
close to bearing it out. By "appears" I mean that the 
word can be found, in some combination with oth­
ers, describing the type of adverse possession which 
will be effective; I do not mean that it has any bear­
ing on the decisions, explicitly or otherwise. Writers 
may separate it, but they have some trouble putting 
much separate content into it. The vice, if it be such, 
of its constant appearance is that somehow it sug­
gests the significance of a belligerent frame of mind 
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on the part of the possessor, and this has played 
some part in the cases. 
The phrase "claim of right," on the other hand 
does not appear so frequently. As we have seen, it 
appears in some statutes; and occasionally it will ap­
pear, without the inducement of a statute, in the list 
of modifiers compiled by a court. When the last is 
the case it may be taken seriously, or it may be just 
part of the verbal ritual. The phrase "claim of 
right" also can suggest a state of mind, although not 
necessarily so. 
Either of these expressions—hostile or claim of 
right—may be taken to mean nothing more than 
that the claimant is in possession of the land, acting 
like an owner, and apparently not in subordination 
to anyone else, such as a landlord or an employer. 
As so viewed, the words add nothing to the mean­
ing of the phrase "adverse possession." If the oc­
cupier is there under someone else, then he has a 
right to be there, and, in theory at least, there should 
be no problem. If, on the other hand, he is acting 
like an owner, but has no right to do so, then, in the 
sense just mentioned, he is "hostile" and "claiming 
a right" in himself. This, I suppose, may be desig­
nated an "objective" view of the matter, although 
I'm never quite certain what that word means. 
That view frequently has been taken, even where 
some such phrase as "claim of right" is included in 
an applicable statute. It is a view which, prior to the 
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decision in Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, had been said 
to prevail in New York, for example.103 
Those who favor the strict Statute of Limita­
tions approach to the whole problem would like us 
to accept this objective view. Where A is on B's land, 
without any right, it would be ridiculous, they 
say, to contend that B has no cause of action unless 
A, the trespasser, has the proper frame of mind. A is 
there; B has a cause of action; and what goes on in­
side A's head has nothing to do with it. Since B has a 
cause of action, and the statute says it will be barred 
after a length of time, it will be barred after that 
time and the job is done. This position has the ap­
peal of simplicity of statement and relative ease of 
application. It is, I believe, essentially the English 
position; and it may reasonably be contended that 
many, if not most, courts in this country have come 
out that way in fact. But certainly many have not; 
and possibly because of that, and possibly also be­
cause of the amount of loose and contradictory talk 
to be found in the cases of almost every state, there 
has been what has been described as a regrettably 
vast amount of litigation about it.104 
An interesting little example of the divergence of 
views on the question of the relevance of the state 
of mind of the adverse possessor occurred in Ohio a 
hundred or so years ago.105 In an adverse possession 
case before the Supreme Court of the State the 
question was whether there was error in the trial 
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court's charge to the jury. A portion of the charge 
was as follows: 
An entry of one man on the land of another is an 
ouster or not, according to the intention with which 
it is done. By the law, the intention guides the 
entry and fixes its character. 
The Supreme Court said there was error—that, in 
effect, the intention of the possessor had nothing to 
do with it. One can't avoid feeling some sympathy 
for the trial judge, for he had taken his idea, and 
the quoted two sentences verbatim, from the opin­
ion in a case arising in Ohio and decided thirty years 
earlier by the Supreme Court of the United States.106 
The latter case involved grantees of the renowned 
Judge John Cleves Symmes, who operated a whole­
sale land business in the Cincinnati-Dayton area 
during territorial days, and who, though said to be 
"not intentionally dishonest,"lor nevertheless had a 
distinct tendency to convey the same land twice. 
While sympathizing with the trial judge, one 
must also feel sympathetic with the position of the 
Ohio Supreme Court. The theory which was offered 
to the jury, that an entry is a disseisin or not de­
pending on the intention with which it is done, has 
been used in some adverse possession cases to pro­
duce results so fantastic that one is inclined to say 
they were not decided but perpetrated. Identify­
ing the adverse possessor as a disseisor invests him 
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with all the use and misuse of the doctrine of seisin. 
It had been held, for example, that a disseisin in 
order to amount to a tort must be intentional; and a 
case or two had held that a temporary and inad­
vertent disseisin did not call into operation the doc­
trine considered earlier so as to prevent a convey­
ance by the true owner.108 Now we move this into 
the case of the real adverse possessor and say that, 
before his occupancy of the land will amount to a 
disseisin—that is, before it will be adverse posses­
sion—it must be intentional, not inadvertent.109 Ac­
cordingly, a person cannot acquire title by adverse 
possession unless he intends to take the other fel­
low's land away from him. If you want to get along 
in this world you have to be a crook. Is this the doc­
trine which required the Lutzes to remove their 
garage, or a part of it, after more than thirty years? 
You will recall that the court said in that case: 
Lutz himself testified that when he built the 
garage he had no survey and thought he was get­
ting it on his own property, which certainly falls 
short of establishing that he did it under a claim 
of title hostile to the true owner.110 
As is suggested by what has just been said, the 
question of hostility and claim of right—and the 
whole question of whether we are going to inquire 
into the intent of the adverse possessor—has been 
fought out principally in the cases of mistaken 
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boundary lines. A's fence is actually encroaching on 
B's lot and A treats the strip involved as his for the 
period of the statute. Both A and B believe the 
fence is on the true line—at least there is nothing to 
indicate the contrary. Does the strip now belong to 
A? Under the one view, the fact that it is a mistake 
makes no difference, since that view does not go 
into the working of A's mind at all; A was there, 
there was a cause of action against him, and that 
does it. Under the other view, A does not acquire 
title to the strip because he did not have the re­
quired grasping state of mind. How could A have 
ousted B, an intentional act, when A, through mis­
take, thought he was on his own land? 
In what was perhaps an effort to soften the 
brazen character of the latter view, the opinion in a 
leading Maine case suggested that if the possessor 
had intended to claim up to the fence whether the 
fence was on the true line or not, his possession 
would come up to scratch and so he would acquire 
title.111 This compounding of the felony has been 
pounced upon in some later cases.112 Now we have 
something much worse, in a sense—it's unmanagea­
ble. It is assumed that we have a case of a mistaken 
boundary, and so the adverse possessor believed 
that the land in question was his. We are going to 
inquire whether, despite the fact that he thought it 
belonged to him, he nevertheless entertained the 
intent to claim the land even if he was wrong. It's 
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conceivable that, over the course of twenty-one 
years, some people may have the time to think such 
thoughts about their fences; I doubt if many of us 
do. What it comes to is the testimony which is given 
at the trial of the case; and the cases show that 
lawyers have discovered the proper question to ask 
on cross-examination: "Mr. A, you say you thought 
the fence was on the correct line—would you have 
claimed this land if you had known that you were 
mistaken?" For some reason people don't like to an­
swer yes to that question. 
In our trip through the mind of the adverse pos­
sessor we have taken a wrong turn somewhere. 
What started out as a requirement of a claim of 
right, and took away Charlie Lutz's house, has 
ended as a requirement of a claim of wrong, which 
took away Mrs. Lutz's garage because it was be­
lieved to be wholly on the builder's own land. Faced 
with results such as this, the urge to stop prying into 
the possessor's intent is very strong. The immediate 
job of application is much simpler if we do not; 
and, if we do not, we can consign to the ash can, 
which is clearly the proper depository, a few adjec­
tives and a couple of hundred years of legal funny-
business. Left alone, I believe this will happen, in 
the slow evolution of property law, which is some­
what comparable to geologic change. The Ameri­
can emphasis on the adverse possessor himself, 
which likely had its origin in pioneer conditions, 
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affection for Civil Law writers, and downright trou­
ble with the concept of seisin, is, I believe, in the 
process of giving way to the theory that the entire 
matter is simply one of the application of the stat­
utes of limitations. The results of the Ohio cases, as 
distinct from the verbiage found in the opinions, 
can, I believe, be analyzed as following from the 
principle of barring a cause of action; u3 and the 
same is true in some other states. New York was be­
lieved to be in this category, despite the wording of 
its statutes, until Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz raised 
some doubts.1" The vigorous advocacy of the Stat­
ute of Limitations approach which appears in the 
article on Adverse Possession in the American Law 
of Property115 likely will have some effect. 
But neither the fact that life would be easier if 
we paid no attention to the intent of an adverse 
possessor, nor the conviction that the reasons which 
courts have advanced for inquiring into his intent 
are silly, and I can think of no more fitting word, 
can mean that we should not take intent into ac­
count. The question, I should think, is open. 
Instances in Which the Statute Does Not Run 
Perhaps a little should be said about kings, con­
victs, and remaindermen—that is, instances in 
which, because of some peculiar situation of the 
owner, the statute either does not run or its running 
is prolonged. These matters may actually be more 
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significant than the others we have been consider­
ing; but, because there is no substantial contest over 
them, they rate less space in the daily press of prop­
erty law. All of them clearly are controlled by the 
theory that the Statute of Limitations bars the suc­
cessful assertion of a cause of action after the pre­
scribed period. 
Statutes of limitations do not run against the 
sovereign. A state cannot make one applicable to the 
federal government. It can, of course, make one ap­
plicable to itself; but this intent must clearly appear 
in the statute, for the presumption is otherwise.116 
Sometimes it is said that it is necessary to preserve 
this attribute of sovereignty in order to protect the 
state from the carelessness of its servants.117 This 
may be a way of saying that the state makes the rules 
and we don't suppose it meant to make them in such 
a way as to lose by them. Occasional statutes do sub­
ject state land to the doctrine of adverse possession, 
sometimes with a longer period being applicable. 
You will be glad to know, for example, that you can 
get title to the English foreshore, which otherwise 
is in the Crown, if you're willing to occupy it ad­
versely for 60 years.118 I don't believe that anyone 
with a pet project to urge before the legislature 
should count on being able to get through a provi­
sion waiving the state's immunity to the Statute of 
Limitations. Legislators are not likely to regard a 
vote to give away state property as good politics. 
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So much for the king—now the convicts. The 
English statute of 1623, which is the prototype of 
all our statutes, provided for an extension of the pe­
riod in the case of certain disabilities existing at the 
time of the accrual of the action. The disabilities 
were infancy, insanity, coverture, imprisonment, 
and that condition known to the English as being 
"beyond the seas." "9 Infancy and insanity continue 
as disabilities everywhere. One can return from "be­
yond the seas" in a hurry these days, so that is 
largely gone as a disability. Coverture may still have 
its disabling features, but they have nothing to do 
with capacity to sue in most states, so that is largely 
gone. Imprisonment is said still to be a disability in 
sixteen states; Ohio is one. In nearly all of the stat­
utes the disability is handled in the same way: The 
statutes provide that, if a disability exists at the 
time a cause of action accrues, the disabled person 
need not bring his action within the generally pre­
scribed period of the statute, but may bring it, 
thereafter, so long as he does it within a stated pe­
riod, frequently ten years, after the removal of the 
disability. Under most statutes, disabilities arising 
after the cause of action has accrued are irrelevant. 
Without meaning to suggest an answer, I ask the 
question: What harm would be done if these dis­
abilities were eliminated altogether? 
Our remaindermen, and for that matter the hold­
ers of other types of future interests, are under an­
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other kind of disability. They have no cause of ac­
tion, since, by definition, they are not entitled to 
the possession of the land. Accordingly, the statute 
of limitations does not begin to run against them 
until they cease being the holders of future inter­
ests and become possessory owners.120 As in the 
case of the convict, this disability has been said to 
be irrelevant if it arises after the adverse possession 
has begun. That is, if A takes adverse possession of 
land owned by B, and B thereafter splits up the 
ownership so as to create say a life estate and a re­
mainder, A will nevertheless acquire title to the 
land when the basic period of the statute has run.121 
There is little on this last point, and you will ob­
serve that it is tied in with a matter previously 
discussed—the capacity of an owner out of posses­
sion to make a conveyance. 
I think it is worth noting that the immunity of 
the state to adverse possession, the matter of the 
statutory immunities, and the fact that adverse 
possession will not operate against the holder of a 
future interest, are all consequences which flow 
from the basic notion that the matter is governed 
by the Statute of Limitations. If the theory were 
really founded on the acquisition of title by the 
possessor, or even the "presumption of a lost grant" 
which is supposed to govern prescription, the posi­
tion of these matters, logically, might be quite dif­
ferent. 
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This, then, is some account of the law of adverse 
possession, and some account of how it came to be 
that way. There is virtually nothing in the books 
that bears on whether it should be the way it is; 
or, for that matter, whether it should be at all. 
This branch of the law is suffering, as are some 
others, from a fundamental difficulty: how can a 
particular question be answered intelligently with­
out some fairly explicit assumption as to the more 
general task to be accomplished? How can I sen­
sibly consider whether to take Route 40 or Route 23 
when I don't know where I'm going? For the most 
part we seem to be able to immerse ourselves in 
the details of a problem to such an extent that 
they consume our entire attention and energy. 
There are more motels on Route 40; it is four-lane 
for longer distances; its surface is safer when the 
weather is bad—enough of this sort of thing and 
we shall have convinced ourselves that we should 
take Route 40. But do we want to go to Wheeling 
or to Toledo? If the answer is Toledo, then the con­
sidered judgment of thousands of motorists that 
Route 40 is the better road, however convincing 
within its own limits, is irrelevant. 

Ill 
The Question of Purpose 
THE DOCTRINE of adverse possession, like other aspects of property law, is in a process of 
change—a process that is almost unbelievably slow, 
that is subject to diversion by almost irrelevant 
factors, that moves in fits and starts, and is not es­
pecially susceptible to forecast. If there is any dis­
cernible trend it appears to be in the direction of 
simplifying things, a trend which, although per­
haps desirable in itself, is forced upon us by the 
insistent press of other, and more significant, mat­
ters. This process of change is such that it has been, 
and, if left alone, will continue to be, accomplished 
without much conscious reference to any particu­
lar purpose except immediate expediency. 
I have headed this part of the discussion "The 
Question of Purpose" deliberately and out of a 
large measure of doubt and humility. I wish to 
raise the question; I do not wish to pontificate about 
the direction things should take. I am not a high 
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priest of progress. In my case it would be point­
less to argue whether I should be. 
I say this more as a warning to myself than other­
wise. Once one raises the question of the purpose 
of anything he is in grave danger. He is likely, if 
he is not careful, to be led to wider and wider 
speculations until he finds himself sitting in his of­
fice with a towel around his head and unable to do 
anything. The temptation to fit things into a grand 
philosophical scheme is undeniable, but those of 
us who cannot qualify as a Genius First Class had 
best resist it. Failure to resist has, I believe, de­
prived us of the benefit of some thinking which, had 
it been contained within manageable limits, might 
have been quite useful. If, by chance, you are a 
genius, then you have nothing to worry about; or, 
to put it another way, there is nothing that can be 
done for you. 
This feeling of hesitancy to venture into a line of 
thought which may end in a tail-spin must, I'm 
sure, be shared by many people. Otherwise it is 
difficult to account for some of the things which 
have happened and are happening in the field of 
property law. The intercontinental ballistic missile 
and the right of entry for condition broken just do 
not seem compatible. We are, I believe, a long 
way removed from any age of "nuclear" law, or 
anything like it. At the same time, I don't quite see 
how, in all conscience, we can continue to purport 
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to answer some of our particular questions in the 
property field without a more explicit reference to 
some rational purpose. 
We have been considering here, in a superficial 
way, some particular questions in a particular, and 
perhaps peculiar, part of property law known as 
"adverse possession." Is it necessary that an adverse 
possessor have, or at least enter the land with, some 
special state of mind in order to acquire title at the 
end of the statutory period? If so, what state of 
mind? Should we allow successive periods of ad­
verse possession by different persons to be added 
together to total the period of the statute? What 
should the period of the statute be? Should the 
state be immune to the operation of the doctrine? 
Should the doctrine operate to bar the right of a 
holder of a future interest? 
How can we possibly answer any of those ques­
tions without inquiring as to our purpose? How 
can we have the nerve to assert that an adverse 
possessor cannot acquire title to land unless he oc­
cupied it under a claim of right, and, at the same 
time, virtually admit, when pressed, that we don't 
know what we're trying to do in the first place? 
Of course, there's nothing new about the posi­
tion I'm taking. And I must say my feeling is that 
other parts of the law have perhaps done a better 
job. Little as I know about contracts and torts, I 
somehow feel that those subjects include a greater 
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content which may be described as implementa­
tion of a purpose. Perhaps I'm wrong. On the other 
hand I have the feeling that criminal law has suf­
fered from inability to make up its mind where it 
wants to go. Perhaps I am wrong again. In any 
event there is no need to accuse the neighbors; our 
own back yard, feodum simplex that it is, has 
enough trash in it. 
So—and not without qualms—I raise the ques­
tion: Why, after certain circumstances have per­
sisted for a certain length of time, do we take one 
man's land away from him and give it to someone 
else? Why do we do it at all? 
Asking this question is likely to evoke what may 
be described as a "hand waving" answer: It's all 
part of the general policy underlying the Statute of 
Limitations. This may be true; and it's also true that 
the trick of freezing things that have been around 
for a long time is, legally, almost universal—found, 
it is said, in all enlightened systems of law.122 We 
have seen it operating, independently of the Statute 
of Limitations, in the early applications of the doc­
trine of prescription; and if we wished to collect 
all of the laws, statutory and otherwise, which op­
erate in the same way as the more generalized stat­
utes of limitations, we would have quite a green 
bag full. 
The difficulty, of course, with this hand-waving 
answer is that it doesn't tell us what the policy of 
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the Statute of Limitations is nor which part of it is 
involved. The fact that something exists in quan­
tity may be regarded, conceivably, as indicating 
that it's useful—law books, for example—but cer­
tainly the fact of quantity does not tell us the use. 
If one presses the point, and actually inquires what 
is the policy of the Statute of Limitations, one gets 
more hand-waving answers—not quite so grandiose 
perhaps, but still generalized and carrying the im­
plication that the subject is closed. This generaliza­
tion is inevitable. When one classes together per­
sonal injuries, contracts for the sale of farm produce, 
petty crimes, actions to recover land, and perhaps 
half a hundred other legal situations, and attempts 
to state some underlying principle, vagueness may 
be expected. Nothing very revealing is likely. Nev­
ertheless, certain of these generalizations bear on 
adverse possession, and it may be profitable to ex­
amine them briefly. 
Statutes of Limitations123 
It is said, so frequently as to become monoto­
nous, that statutes of limitations are designed to 
protect against stale claims after evidence has be­
come lost, memories have faded and witnesses 
have disappeared. This statement represents not 
one idea but several. 
The dictionary definition of "stale" is "old and 
strong." This scarcely can be what is meant when 
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used with reference to the Statute of Limitations. 
These claims do not literally have an odor. The 
word "stale" in this connection must mean either 
simply "unenforceable," which of course is the is­
sue, or it is an attempt to include all of the specific 
purposes of the statute in one word, an attempt 
which fails. 
The proposition that statutes of limitations are 
designed to protect against the assertion of claims 
after evidence to refute them has been lost, from 
one cause or another, is fairly obvious; but it should 
be noted that the applicability of the proposition is 
not as broad as the operation of the statutes them­
selves. This concern is with the preservation of a 
potential defendant's evidence, not a plaintiff's; and 
it is limited to claims which it is assumed he could 
have resisted successfully had the lost evidence 
been available. If one assumes that the plaintiff's 
claim was "good," in the sense that it could have 
been proved in the first place, the defendant can be 
no worse off no matter how much time has elapsed. 
Statutes of limitations operate to bar "good" as 
well as "bad" claims, and the purpose in barring 
the "good" ones must be something other than pro­
tection against the failure of evidence. If it were 
not we would be throwing out equal quantities of 
babies and bath water. 
In the application of the Statute of Limitations 
to actions to recover land, it is apparent that "good" 
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as well as "bad" claims are barred. Indeed the des­
ignation of the doctrine as "adverse possession" in­
dicates an assumption that the claim which a plain­
tiff is attempting to assert has an original basis in 
right. Further, the problem of avoiding the success­
ful assertion of nonmeritorious claims appears to be 
less pressing in land cases than in some others. It 
may be that in earlier times the establishment of 
land titles depended on witnesses—we have stories 
of small boys being forced to attend liveries of 
seisin and being whipped so the memory of the oc­
casion would endure—but record title, which is 
what we are talking about, commonly is proved, in 
these days, by the record. The "lost grant" theory 
of the later prescription cases is not the theory of 
adverse possession, and even in prescription it can 
hardly be taken seriously. As applied to land cases, 
the general purpose to protect against the assertion 
of "bad" claims may have some merit in relation to 
the resolution of ambiguous surveys. We do have 
in the original surveys of much of the country such 
dubious calls as "thence S. 73 degrees W. 10 poles 
to four sugar trees and a mulberry." 124 In times 
past persons may have needed to resort to witnesses 
to establish title to particular land under surveys 
of this sort and the doctrine of adverse possession 
may have resolved many of these old difficulties. 
To the extent that it has, it has done its work so far 
as the original surveys are concerned. I suspect 
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that there still may be some of this work to be done 
with respect to ambiguities created by more re­
cently drawn descriptions in deeds. 
A quite different and much broader purpose of 
the statutes of limitations is suggested by the fre­
quently reiterated statement that these statutes are 
"statutes of repose." Repose for whom? For the 
courts, for potential defendants, or for the general 
public? 
It has been intimated that these statutes are a 
practical device to spare the courts from litigation 
of old causes of action; but this has been denied 
vigorously, and I should think properly, on the 
ground that since courts are established to deal 
with litigation it would be strange to forbid litiga­
tion so as not to bother the courts.1251 suggest that 
we can forget any such purpose as this. 
The "repose" of individual defendants is a more 
complex purpose and perhaps more debatable. 
Here the policy of repose overlaps partially that of 
protecting defendants against the loss of combative 
evidence. If a claim is assumed to be bad, the policy 
of protecting a defendant from a failure of evidence 
and a policy which favors his "repose" are very 
much the same. The thing most likely to keep him 
awake nights is lack of evidence to support the 
facts. If, on the other hand, it is assumed that the 
claim against him is a meritorious one, we have an 
entirely different question: Is it a proper purpose 
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to enable a person who has committed a wrong, or 
who, as in the property cases we are concerned 
with, is in the continuing process of committing 
one, to be able to disregard it after a time? This 
question has been argued on moral grounds and 
has provoked some dispute even as to the proper 
application of Christian principles.126 Whatever the 
validity of these arguments, it can be conceded that 
such a purpose is not prima facie outlandish. It 
certainly can be contended reasonably that a per­
son is entitled to shape his affairs on the assumption 
that a claim against him, however just, will not be 
pressed after being allowed to lie dormant for a 
considerable time. 
If this general purpose—the repose of individual 
potential defendants—should be taken as the domi­
nant one, it would have an interesting application 
in our land case. There will be no interference with 
the repose of such a potential defendant if he does 
not know that a cause of action is outstanding 
against him. Accordingly, in the case of the mis­
taken boundary, the adverse possessor should ac­
quire no title, no matter for how long his occupa­
tion up to the supposed line continues. Conceivably 
it could be contended that he is entitled not only 
to his repose with respect to what he takes to be 
the facts, but also to the additional smugness 
which comes from knowing generally that, even 
if he has slipped somewhere, things will work out 
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all right eventually; but this is giving him a little 
too much rest. 
Assertions that the statutes of limitations are stat­
utes of "repose" usually, however, do not suggest 
that it is the repose of the individual which is in 
question; rather the context indicates that the re­
pose which is in mind is that of the "public" or of 
« • •_ " 127 
society. 
Although society properly may be interested in 
the welfare of an individual, it is clear that the in­
terest referred to here is that of those persons who 
have dealings with others and, accordingly, are 
concerned in the stability of the positions of those 
with whom they deal. Without this stability there 
would be little repose for anyone. The operation of 
this social purpose is especially evident in some 
instances such as the one with which we are con­
cerned, the transfer of property; but it is difficult 
to imagine one to which it does not apply. 
The social purpose is not limited, as the others 
may be, by concern as to whether a particular claim 
against a defendant is good or bad; the disruption 
of affairs is the same in either case. And, for the 
same reason, it makes no difference whether the 
person directly affected knew of the claim against 
him. This social purpose appears, then, to accord 
more nearly than the others with the way in which 
limitations, taken as a group, have been applied. 
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Counter Purposes 
Some of the purposes just considered may be 
more persuasive than others, and some may have a 
wider application than others, but they all point in 
the same direction—limitation, and the shorter the 
better. If they stood alone they would dictate not 
only that actions be limited as to time but that they 
should be prohibited. Of course there is an obvious 
counter policy, that of fairness to persons who have 
claims, which prevents that result and which op­
erates constantly on all limitations questions. For 
various reasons we may want to limit the time of 
bringing actions, but we don't want to do it at the 
expense of fairness to those whose rights are being 
invaded. This accounts, in our discussion, for the 
disabilities, and the immunity of the holders of fu­
ture interests, and it also bears quite importantly 
on the length of the prescribed periods. 
Purpose and Adverse Possession of Land 
Generalized purposes of statutes of limitations 
are, of course, relevant to adverse possession, but 
they are, of necessity, so general that direct applica­
tion, except perhaps in an instance or two, is not 
readily apparent. As has been suggested, the de­
velopment of the law of adverse possession has not 
been noted for explicit reference to the purpose 
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which it was supposed to accomplish. However we 
have had occasional references to it; infrequently 
by courts, more often by commentators. These ref­
erences, almost without exception, also have been 
of the hand-waving sort. But, cavalier or not, they 
are offered as reasons and entitled to a hearing. 
There has been some suggestion that we take 
away an owner's land and give it to an adverse 
possessor, after the lapse of a prescribed time, in 
order to punish the owner for his neglect.128 In part 
this suggestion derives from what is essentially a 
misinterpretation of other statements. When it is 
said that the English position, which as you recall 
emphasizes the running of the Statute of Limita­
tions rather than the acquiring of title by the ad­
verse possessor, focuses on the demerit of the owner 
rather than the merit of the one in possession,129 
this is simply an assertion of fact about the tech­
nical approach. Such statements are not, I believe, 
intended to be assertions that the purpose of the 
business is to punish the neglectful owner. The 
word "demerit" is unfortunate. In part, too, the 
conclusion that we are trying to punish neglect can 
be traced to statements made in the support of pet 
ideas. Dean Ames, who was interested in promul­
gating his gospel that successive periods of ad­
verse possession could be added together to make 
out the limitation period even in the absence of 
privity, argued that, privity or not, the laches of 
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the owner was the same and should be attended 
with the same consequences.130 If the punishment 
notion is removed from this setting and examined 
independently, there is little or nothing to com­
mend it. If we feel impelled to punish a person, 
we have a criminal law whose business it is to do 
it. I am not, of course, suggesting that it should be 
a crime to fail to bring an action against an adverse 
possessor; but in any event the idea has no place 
in the law of adverse possession itself. 
Somewhat related to the "punishment" purpose 
is the theory that the purpose of the doctrine of ad­
verse possession is to encourage the development of 
land. This has a much better sound; it has an eco­
nomic sound; and "development" is so important 
that we have endless commissions engaged in it. 
If "the encouragement of the development of 
land," when offered as a purpose of the law of ad­
verse possession, refers to encouragement through 
facilitating the transfer of land titles, then it is only 
a more generalized statement of a matter which we 
shall consider shortly. However, the context of 
some of the earlier statements of the "encourage­
ment" purpose suggests that what was intended 
was the encouragement of the development of va­
cant lands by persons who had no very good reason 
to regard themselves as the rightful owners. It may 
be conceded, at least for the sake of discussion, 
that there is nothing inherently wrong in such a 
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suggestion. Yet two questions seem pertinent: First, 
do we need so to encourage the use of land? Are 
we running out of space, and if so, is it because 
large areas of land are unused or is it simply be­
cause there are getting to be too many of us? Others 
will have to answer these questions; I assert only 
that they are pertinent. Second, and more pertinent 
it seems to me, is the question whether, even if 
there is a great need to encourage the develop­
ment of land, the doctrine of adverse possession, 
by any reasonable stretch of the imagination, can 
do it. Of course I don't know, and, I suggest, neither 
do you; but my hunch is that it will not do so. If 
we suppose a person with an urge to use someone 
else's land, and who is deterred from doing so by 
the possible consequences, will his reluctance be 
overcome by the knowledge that, if he gets away 
with it for a sufficiently long period, he will be in 
the clear? Everyone to his own hunches. 
Neither punishment nor the encouragement of 
land development has been the purpose most fre­
quently stated as that of the doctrine of adverse 
possession. From the time of the basic Statute of 
Limitations in 1623m the purpose has been said 
to be the clearing of title to land. That statute be­
gan with the words, which writers frequently have 
repeated, "For quieting of men's estates. 
These words are meager enough, although they 
constitute a better legislative history than we have 
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for some recent state legislation. The fact that they 
appear in the original statute is of little importance 
nearly three and a half centuries later. Whatever 
may have been in the mind of the original drafts­
men, I take it that the "quieting of men's estates" 
is now taken to refer, not to the repose of the in­
dividual person which may arise from the statute, 
but rather to the "social" purpose to which we re­
ferred as the principal purpose of the statute gen­
erally. As so viewed, the limitation of actions to re­
cover land appears to fit not directly under a broad 
social or economic purpose, but indirectly, under 
the more specific policy of facilitating transfers of 
land.132 
It is, I suppose, open to anyone who wants to do 
so to contend that facility in the transfer of inter­
ests in land is not a proper end; but I should think 
the accumulated evidence, both in words and in 
activity, leads to the conclusion that he would be 
outvoted by a large margin. At least by common 
supposition, the law has been engaged in a free 
alienability project for hundreds of years, and a 
multitude of statutory enactments, bar association 
activities, and the like, certainly point in that direc­
tion. Seeing no convincing argument to the con­
trary, I for one, am willing to accept the purpose 
of facilitating transfers as a proper one. 
It seems equally clear that transfers will be facili­
tated by the removal, so far as practicable, of 
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doubts which may beset the transferee. Whether to 
buy a given thing, land or something else, must in­
evitably involve a balancing and a decision of 
greater or less significance. If the decision is of any 
substantial importance, it is likely to be a difficult 
one. If we can avoid adding to the purchaser's prob­
lem a further doubt as to whether he actually will 
get what he expects to get, even if he does buy it, 
we have done him a service. What we wish to do, 
then, is to enable him to know, so far as we can, 
what he is going to get for his money. If someone 
proposes to sell me an automobile, I should know 
whether he owns it, or, perhaps more accurately, 
whether he has the power to transfer it. 
In the case of land the considerations are analyti­
cally the same—I want to know whether the person 
who proposes to transfer to me has the power to do 
so. But the nature of land and land transfers is such 
that the proposition may be more meaningful if 
put in another, and almost illogical, way: The pur­
chaser needs to know, first, that the vendor owns 
the land, and second, that this is the land he owns. 
Ownership of land, in the conceptual sense, is mani­
fested by a series of treaties, recorded surveys, 
deeds, plats, more deeds, wills, and various other 
writings; but none of these pieces of paper has the 
capacity to go out and locate itself, as it were, on 
the ground. Our purchaser wants to know that the 
title is good and that the boundaries are right. 
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This, then, is an accepted purpose, and, at least 
for discussion, it is the purpose against which we 
are trying to judge the doctrine of adverse posses­
sion. Where does the doctrine fit? 
We have seen that possession is primitive owner­
ship. In a society which provides no other means of 
delineating right, a purchaser can, and does, rely 
on possession by his prospective vendor. In the be­
ginnings of our law, and in the beginnings of the 
doctrine now called adverse possession, this was 
true not only of personality but of land as well. 
But this is not the beginning of the reign of Rich­
ard I, nor is it 1623, and things have changed. 
With respect to many chattels we still rely largely 
on possession in contemplating a deal. If I find a 
dozen baseball bats in a department store bin, I 
feel safe in buying one of them. Since we have a 
theory of ownership separate from possession, I'm 
taking a slight chance, but I'm prepared to take it 
in view of the amount involved and other protec­
tions which I have. When I move from baseball bats 
to automobiles things are different. With securities 
we have something else again. And it is clear that 
land is still another thing. It's conceivable that 
someone today might buy land on the strength of 
bare possession in the vendor, but the conventional 
pattern certainly is otherwise. It is here, it seems 
to me that the law of adverse possession as applied 
to land and the doctrine of the same name which 
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may be applied to personal property must separate. 
The function of neither doctrine can be considered 
apart from other devices which the law has pro­
vided for the same, or related, purposes. These 
other devices are markedly different in land transac­
tions, on the one hand, and those involving personal 
property on the other. Accordingly, although the 
legal talk about adverse possession is much the 
same whether one or the other is involved, the 
analysis with respect to purpose may be different, 
and I elect to pursue the problem only as it relates 
to land. 
Remembering, then, that the problem is the facil­
itation of the transfer of interests in land by enabling 
a purchaser to know with fair certainty what he is 
buying, and that the immediate problem is the role 
which the doctrine of adverse possession plays in 
forwarding this purpose, the next step is to look at 
the setting in which adverse possession finds itself 
with relation to land transactions. 
The Torrens System 
I mention first, and out of historical order, the 
statutory system of land title registration known as 
the Torrens Act. I do this for two reasons:first, be­
cause it may be in the minds of some of you, and 
second, because of a detail in connection with it 
which has some bearing on our subject. 
This system, as many of you know, is one which 
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provides for the registration of title to land, as dis­
tinct from the device more familiar to us of record­
ing the chain of instruments by which title to land 
is derived. Its details are set out in more than 120 
sections of the Ohio Revised Code,133 many of them 
quite long, and, even if time would permit, there 
would be little point in going into those details 
here. The essence of the act is that an owner who 
wishes to register his land may do so by instituting 
proceedings, provided for in detail, which are some­
what analogous to a suit to quiet title. If the ap­
plicant's title is found good, a decree of confirma­
tion and registration is entered, which, after the 
expiration of the time for appeal, is conclusive 
against all claims, with certain supposedly minor 
exceptions. Pursuant to this decree, the title is 
registered by the county recorder and a certificate 
of title is given to the owner. Subsequent transfers 
of the land are made either by deed or by assign­
ment on the certificate of title, but the transfer is 
not actually effected until it has been registered 
and a new certificate of title issued to the new 
owner; prior to that the deed, or other instrument, 
is merely a contract. A feature of the Torrens Act 
is the provision for an insurance fund, administered 
by the state treasurer, to be used to reimburse 
those who sustain loss, by reason of fraud or mis­
take, after the registration of the land. The fund 
arises from contributions, based on the assessed 
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value of the land, and made at the time of the 
original registration. 
This system of transfer may be thought of as 
roughly similar to our system of automobile titles. 
A very significant difference is that land title regis­
tration is not compulsory, at least it is not so in any 
of the fifteen or so states in America which have 
statutes allowing it. The English have been work­
ing toward compulsory registration.134 
Much ink and breath has been expended on the 
merits and demerits of the Torrens acts. Its vig­
orous proponents are sometimes described as 
"thoughtful persons," 135 and sometimes as "those 
strange people who seem convinced that change, 
whatever it may be, is certain to be progress."136 
We have the rather unusual spectacle of a law 
school professor writing a book in which he ad­
vocated that registration be abandoned in New 
York.137 He was immediately and vigorously at­
tacked, not only by some other professors but also 
by some members of the bar. One of the latter, in 
the course of a twenty-page article, referred to him 
as "the professor" forty-seven times.138 I shouldn't 
want to get into that. 
Whatever the merits of the system the fact is— 
and I'm almost afraid to say this—that, except per­
haps in three states, it has not been widely ac­
cepted.139 For whatever reasons, good or bad, land 
has not been registered in quantities sufficient to en­
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able us to regard the Torrens Act as an existing 
solution to the problem. And it's had a fair chance. 
The present Ohio act became effective when I was 
three years old; "° and, whatever my enthusiasm 
may have been then, it has cooled some. 
A detail of the Torrens system which is of some 
interest in connection with the present discussion 
is the provision included in many of the acts, in­
cluding that of Ohio, that land which has been 
registered under the system cannot be taken by 
prescription or by adverse possession."1 Whether 
that exclusion is wise or not in the working of the 
system itself, it indicates a judgment that the pur­
pose of the doctrine is the clearing of titles, and 
that, given the assurance of title and an accurate 
survey, which the act is supposed to provide, the 
doctrines of prescription and adverse possession 
would be not only unnecessary but undesirable. 
The Record Title 
What we do have generally in this country, in­
cluding of course the states in which registration is 
optional, is a system of recording acts. The acts are 
an American, not an English, invention; but they 
are not at all recent. Their beginnings can be traced 
back to the early Seventeenth Century in the Plym­
outh Colony.142 These acts vary considerably. They 
have in common the process of placing on record 
the instruments, of one sort or another, which have 
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to do with the ownership of land, plus a certain pro­
tection which they give to a prospective purchaser 
who relies on the record. They do not, in any way, 
provide for a record of the "title" to the land; they 
merely record, for the public view, some of the 
things, and only some, which bear on the title. The 
protection afforded is much more narrow than a 
layman would be inclined to believe. It consists 
principally of a reversal of the common law priority 
notion of first come, first served. A purchaser is pro­
tected from a prior conveyance which may have 
been made by one of the owners in his chain of 
title, if that prior conveyance has not been re­
corded, and, in some states, if he otherwise has no 
notice of it. 
There are, however, a whole list of difficulties 
which may beset a prospective purchaser, which 
the record may not reveal, and against which the 
recording statute will not protect him. It would 
take too long, and be too boring, to go into them 
here; but it is interesting that one of these extra-
record difficulties arises from the doctrine of ad­
verse possession itself: If, somewhere back along 
the line, the land has been taken away from one of 
the record title holders by adverse possession, an 
entirely new chain of title will have been started. 
This does not appear on the record because the 
taking by adverse possession was not a conveyance 
which could have been recorded. Accordingly, un­
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less the holders of the record title have taken the 
land back in a similar high-handed fashion, our 
purchaser may be stuck by the very doctrine which 
was supposed to facilitate transfers to him. 
Remembering that there are fairly serious holes 
in the recording system, let's look at the situation 
of a prospective purchaser. 
Let's suppose, first, that an accurate survey has 
been made and there is no question as to the iden­
tity and extent of the land he may buy. The concern 
is with the title to it. He, and of course we mean 
someone acting for him, examines the record, either 
through an abstract or otherwise. Suppose he finds 
that there has been a prior recorded conveyance of 
the land to someone other than his prospective 
vendor—that is, it appears that record title is in 
someone else. Would he buy from the vendor on 
the strength of the vendor's apparently having been 
in possession of the land for longer than the period 
of the statute? I should think not; he would be buy­
ing a lawsuit. Would he buy the land from the one 
who had the record title? I doubt it again, and for 
the same reason. The question of who owns this 
land is up in the air—whether the land actually 
has been taken by adverse possession will have to 
be settled before he knows who the proper vendor 
is. In this situation the doctrine of adverse posses­
sion hasn't facilitated the transfer; it has held it up 
by raising a doubt as to who owns the place. 
ADVERSE POSSESSION 
Now let's take an entirely different "suppose." 
Suppose the search of the record reveals that the 
record title apparently is in the prospective vendor 
—there is no substantial doubt about it, so far as 
the purchaser can tell from the books and indexes 
available to him. In this situation, will the fact, if 
it be such, that the prospective vendor apparently 
has been in possession for longer than the period 
of the statute facilitate the transfer? Well—it may 
make our purchaser feel better about it. Unknown 
defects which are not suggested by the record, but 
which conceivably could rise to plague him, will be 
defeated if, but only if, there has been the required 
type of possession for the statutory period, and if 
the unknown defects have not involved disabili­
ties, and if these unknown defects have not re­
sulted in the creation of future interests which are 
not yet barred, and if the state isn't involved in it. 
This is a lot of "ifs" to put in the way of barring a 
defect which was itself "iffy" in the first place. I 
should think the facilitating value of the protection, 
while there, is not very persuasive. 
A third "suppose" likely is the one which is the 
fact in most cases: The record itself is not perfect 
but it looks fairly good for the prospective vendor. 
It has its odd spots, which conceivably may be de­
fects, but perhaps, on the other hand, are not. What 
then of the fact that the vendor appears to have 
been in possession for longer than the statutory pe­
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riod? The answer seems to be the same as in "sup­
pose" number 2. The defects actually are unknown, 
as in the second case, but here the possibility of 
their existence is suggested to a greater or less de­
gree by the record. The fact of possession by the 
potential vendor is some solace; it has some per­
suasiveness toward acceptance of the deal. But 
again all the "ifs" of possible failure to show ad­
verse possession, possible disabilities, and possible 
future interests are present; and these will have to 
be balanced against the unknown "ifs" of the pos­
sible defect. 
It seems, then, that there is some facilitating go­
ing on here, but not very much. It is this sort of 
thing, I believe, which prompted a statement in 
Bayse's book on land titles, which is not the usual 
statement to find in print: 
The importance of [statutes of limitations] 
for providing a good record title is not so great as 
might be supposed.143 
A consideration of all this suggests, and this has 
been noted by others, that the doctrine of adverse 
possession has its greatest application in cases 
where, in all likelihood, there has been no adverse 
possession at all. It is used merely as some slight 
assurance to a prospective purchaser of protection 
against claims which may exist, but which probably 
do not. 
1 0 4
 ADVERSE POSSESSION 
This leads to a further point which I think is sig­
nificant. In the situation we have been examining 
the possession of the land, as such, has nothing to 
do with it. A purchaser relies on the record, not on 
the fact that his vendor has possession. What we 
really want to do is to bar claims inconsistent with 
the record title unless they are asserted within a rea­
sonable period. Whether the holder of the record 
title has been in possession or not is really irrelevant. 
Why, then, don't we just bar the old claims? 
Now I have not seen the proposition put in quite 
that way; but it is apparent, I suggest, that we are 
beginning to work in that direction. Suppose a deed 
in our prospective vendor's chain of title was de­
livered and recorded forty years ago; suppose fur­
ther that the execution was defective in that it did 
not include a valid acknowledgment by the grantor. 
Under the law, the deed passed no title, but every­
one has been acting all the time as though it did. 
This would be a typical case for the application of 
adverse possession to "clear the title." If one is con­
vinced that the possession has been consistent with 
the record title for the required period, that is, has 
been sufficiently adverse, whatever that may mean, 
and that there are no disabilities or future interests 
hanging around to interfere, then the title will be 
regarded as good. But, under the present law in 
Ohio, and I suspect most states, he wouldn't have 
to worry about adverse possession with all its "ifs." 
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So-called "curative" statutes, of one sort or another 
exist in many states. The general effect of these stat­
utes is simply to wipe out the capacity of certain 
defects to upset the title after a certain length of 
time. The Ohio act, for example, provides that an 
instrument which has been of record for more than 
twenty-one years shall be cured of a defective ac­
knowledgment, along with other specified de­
fects.1" This, if you please, for the purpose of facili­
tating transfers, is adverse possession without the 
possession; and it is the obvious way to go at the 
problem. 
A similar, and more far-reaching, device exists in 
a few states which have the so-called "marketable 
title" statutes.145 These statutes are fairly complex 
and they differ from each other. Typically, and this 
description is over-simplified, they provide that all 
outstanding interests which may affect the record 
title, such as easements, future interests, and the 
like, are invalid unless they are re-asserted on the 
record once every thirty years, or once every forty 
years. If they are so re-asserted, and machinery is 
provided for doing it, they are preserved; otherwise 
these interests are cut off. This, again, is attacking 
the essential job without getting side-tracked by the 
idea of possession. These "marketable title" acts 
are going to spread, I believe. A model act has been 
prepared by Professor Simes, and it is currently re­
ceiving considerable attention.146 
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As marketable title acts are more widely adopted, 
and as curative acts are extended to cover more de­
fects, the function of the doctrine of adverse posses­
sion as an affirmative device for clearing land titles 
will diminish still further. Its capacity to upset 
titles, because of the possibility that a stranger to 
the record may have acquired title by adverse pos­
session, will remain. Acts of this type, unlike the 
Torrens acts, do not eliminate adverse possession. 
The time will come, and I'm not suggesting that it 
has come already, to raise the question whether, in 
relation to land titles, adverse possession isn't doing 
more harm than good. 
Boundary Disputes 
All of the above, you will recall, has been on the 
assumption that the prospective purchaser was con­
cerned only with the question of the "title" to the 
land. We assumed that the actual physical bound­
aries of the tract in which he was interested were 
established. But, of course, there may be a problem 
here; and it differs somewhat from the title prob­
lem. Its nature is known, or should be, and the per­
son who may raise the question is known. 
The purchaser, for some reason, may elect to rely 
on the apparent physical boundaries of the land 
and have no survey made. If he does this, he will 
have, as in the case of title question, some protec­
tion by reason of the doctrine of adverse possession; 
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but, again as in the title question, the protection is 
subject to all the "ifs" which attach to the doctrine. 
If a survey is made, and in a transaction of impor­
tance I suppose it's likely, then the result of the 
survey, assuming its accuracy, will either substan­
tially confirm the apparent boundaries, or show that 
they are substantially wrong. If the survey accords 
with the apparent boundaries, there is no occasion 
to consider adverse possession. If the survey does 
not, then the effect of the existence of the doctrine 
of adverse possession is to raise a problem, not set­
tle one. Absent the doctrine, the purchaser would 
know that what he is being offered is the land as 
shown by the survey; he could take it or leave it. 
With the doctrine, and all of its "ifs," he doesn't 
know whether he is going to get the disputed strip 
or not; and this situation can hardly be said to be 
one which facilitates the transfer of the land.147 
Application to Specific Questions 
Given this setting of the doctrine of adverse pos­
session in relation to other devices which the law 
has provided for facilitating the transfer of land, 
and conceding that the doctrine will be retained 
perhaps beyond the time when its usefulness will 
have been exhausted, what does it all mean with 
regard to the particular rules of which the doctrine 
is made up? What of the length of the period? 
What of the disabilities? What of color of title? 
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What of claim of right? What of "tacking"? What 
of the whole matter of the intent of the adverse pos­
sessor? 
I think there is some danger of taking the wrong 
tack at the beginning. It seems apparent that the 
job of quieting things for prospective purchasers 
does not require that the benefit of the doctrine of 
adverse possession be extended to what people like 
to call "a mere squatter." The purchaser does not 
rely on possession, he relies on ownership. It is the 
record title that concerns him. Accordingly, the 
possession of a person who does have color of title, 
at least, and who does appear to be claiming the 
title is the possession with which we are primarily 
concerned. It is tempting, then, to shape the rules 
so as to make it possible to include the holder of a 
record title in the operation of the doctrine, and ex­
clude the squatter. Accordingly, it may be sug­
gested that the purpose analysis dictates the re­
quirements of color of title and claim of right in 
the rules governing adverse possession. From the 
point of view of clearing the record title there is 
something to this. To the extent that squatters are 
excluded, the possibility that the record title will 
be upset through adverse possession taken earlier 
by someone extraneous to the record will be less­
ened, although not by any means eliminated. On 
the other hand, the addition of these requirements 
means that less reliance can be placed on the pos­
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session of the record owner. The color of title re­
quirement interferes with the application of ad­
verse possession to the question of boundaries; a 
person who occupies a strip of land along his 
boundary by mistake has no color of title to the 
strip. Further, and more significant, the require­
ment of claim of right gets us into all the befuddle­
ment, inconsistency, and litigation that is involved 
in going into the intention of the possessor. It adds 
some of the biggest "ifs" to the situation of the 
prospective purchaser. Is getting rid of the squatter 
worth it? There's judgment, or perhaps hunch, in­
volved of course; but mine is that, from the point 
of view of facilitating transfers, it's not worth it. 
Now it's possible to say, of course, that there is 
an affirmative policy against squatters, and that the 
furthering of that justifies interfering to some ex­
tent with the transfer policy. Of course, anyone is 
entitled to assert such a policy. I have some doubts 
about it, but, as I said earlier, I'm not a priest of 
policy—at least at the moment. In any event, if 
we were to grant such a policy we would simply 
begin the reasoning process all over again, starting 
very likely with the proposition that a good way to 
stop squatters from taking land by adverse posses­
sion is to have no doctrine of adverse possession. 
The suggestion of a counter policy here does point 
out, however, that inevitably there will be counter 
policies, inevitably policies will buck each other, 
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and inevitably compromise decisions will have to 
be made. 
What has been said suggests that, so far as the 
operation of the doctrine of adverse possession as 
a device for facilitating land transfers is concerned, 
the detailed rules of the doctrine should be shaped 
so as to remove as many of the "ifs" as possible. 
The trend toward simplification should, I should 
think, be encouraged. We should not become em­
broiled over the state of mind of the adverse posses­
sor, we should not require a "claim of right," or a 
"claim of wrong" for that matter. The "privity" 
presently required for "tacking" likely will exist in 
all cases in which the facilitation purpose calls for 
the application of the doctrine of adverse posses­
sion; but it's difficult to see any real point in the 
requirement. As to the length of the periods and 
the disabilities, we obviously are facing a counter 
policy. Solely from the point of view of transfer, 
the length of the period should be zero and there 
should be no disabilities. Clearly this won't do, and 
we must look to the question of fairness to see to 
what extent the transfer policy must give way. 
There is no time for that here. I merely say that, 
apart from the holders of future interests, I ques­
tion whether there is any need for the disabilities; 
and, further, that twenty-one years, or even fifteen, 
seems a very long time. 
It would be quite proper, I think, to say that 
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the case of the mistaken boundary involves matters 
quite distinct from any consideration of the trans­
ferability of the land. The settling of the issues be­
tween the adjoining owners has an importance all of 
its own, especially where there has been all manner 
of reliance on the mistake. It may be that the im­
portance of a just resolution of the parties' difficul­
ties exceeds the questionable effect which an ap­
plication of the doctrine of adverse possession to the 
situation has on the facility of transfer. If that is 
so, and it very well may be, then the matter must 
be handled separately, and the doctrine of adverse 
possession, while perhaps relevant, will have to 
stand in line with other suggested approaches. Mis­
take cases are difficult ones. They are not satisfac­
torily decided by any such tomfoolery as, say, the 
notion of "relation back." 
Conclusion 
The question in this whole matter, it seems to me, 
is not whether I've been right in what I've said 
about the purpose of the doctrine of adverse pos­
session, or whether I've made proper deductions, or 
whether I haven't missed this or that important as­
pect of the matter. I'll concede on that. The real 
question is whether it isn't better to talk in this 
way than to purport to solve a live problem by an 
incantation, such as the assertion that disseisin is an 
intentional act. 
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